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Introduction
The profitability of Spanish deposit institutions continued to increase in the first half of 2004, 
while there was a very slight fall in solvency indicators. The favourable results achieved, de-
spite the strongly competitive environment in which the institutions operate, are explained by 
the growth of their business in Spain, the more favourable performance of their business 
abroad, the decline in doubtful assets and the increase in efficiency arising from the cost-con-
tainment drive.
Banking risks The sustained growth of economic activity in Spain, together with the recovery in the industr-
ialised countries and Latin America, enabled the growth of the assets of Spanish deposit insti-
tutions and, in particular, their financing to the private sector to accelerate. However, the 
growth of lending and, more specifically, of credit to productive activities, continues to show a 
marked dichotomy between credit to construction and property development and credit to 
other sectors. Previous editions of the FSR have already commented on the high credit risk 
displayed by this type of property-linked lending in the last economic downturn in Spain.
Doubtful assets fell significantly year-on-year. Combined with credit growth, this led to a further 
reduction in the doubtful assets ratios, which was more marked in the case of foreign busi-
ness. Even so, the latter ratio remained significantly higher than those for business in Spain. 
The recovery in activity in the developed countries and, among the emerging economies, in 
Latin America, largely accounts for these developments. The risk profile of the institutions’ 
credit portfolio and of their foreign assets also displayed a downward trend. In short, the ex-
post credit risk indicators moved favourably. However, it is worth recalling that there is a very 
long lag between rapid credit growth and the emergence of doubtful asset problems, and that 
credit to certain sectors has been increasing at very high rates in recent years.
The high rate of increase in house prices sustained in recent years, the low level of interest 
rates and the growth of employment and of gross household income continued to be condu-
cive to increases in the indebtedness of Spanish households. Although the financial situation 
of Spanish households remains solid and their debt burden stable, the sustained growth of 
their indebtedness makes them increasingly sensitive to adverse shocks. In addition, the high 
proportion of variable-rate loans increases the sensitivity of the household debt burden to 
changes in the cost of debt.
Deposit institutions’ growing debit balance with the resident private sector, as a conse-
quence of the sustained growth in the financing of firms and households and the more 
moderate growth in bank liabilities vis-à-vis such residents, is increasingly obliging them to 
obtain funds through external interbank financing and securities issuance. This has had a 
negative impact on the cost structure of institutions’ financing and, ultimately, on their 
spreads and margins.
The need for Spanish deposit institutions to finance the strong expansion in credit has led 
them to develop a strategy involving the increasing securitisation of their loan portfolios, espe-
cially of their mortgage loans, and to issue more covered bonds (cédulas hipotecarias). At the 
same time, they are continuing to promote their asset management activities. This business, 
which they conduct both in Spain and abroad, in particular in Latin America, gives Spanish 
deposit institutions a very significant presence in the management of mutual funds and pen-
sion funds. Also, banks use the insurance companies they control to supplement the financial 
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services provided to their customers. This enables them to diversify their sources of revenue 
and to increase efficiency (economies of range). In general, the insurance companies control-
led by Spanish deposit institutions are highly profitable and have a significant presence in the 
market, although this varies according to the type of insurance concerned.
Stock-market indices have remained relatively steady since the beginning of the year, with 
a low implied volatility. Official interest rate rises in the United States have been assimilated 
by the bond markets in an orderly fashion. The market risk of Spanish deposit institutions 
does not seem high, at present, so the results of the trading book were very low in the first 
half.
The profits of Spanish deposit institutions accelerated in the first half of 2004, extending the 
trend observed in the last two editions of the FSR. The return on equity (ROE) increased again, 
with a widening of the spread over long-term public debt. These developments were the result, 
first, of institutions’ lower net provisions and write-downs, owing to the decline in doubtful as-
sets and the substantial amortisation of goodwill in previous years; and, second, of the in-
crease in efficiency arising from the cost-containment drive by institutions.
Profitability For the first time since the FSR began to be published in November 2002, all three profit mar-
gins rose, in absolute terms, for Spanish deposit institutions as a whole. These increases stem 
from the strong growth in activity, with an acceleration of business in Spain and a much less 
unfavourable performance by foreign business, following the declines seen in recent years, and 
they occurred in spite of the further narrowing of the spread between the return on assets and 
the cost of liabilities in business in Spain. Asset management and insurance activities enabled 
commissions to grow in line with total assets. Finally, the low growth of operating expenses, 
well below that of activity, made it possible for the efficiency ratio to improve and contributed 
to the growth in profits. The favourable trend in provisions and write-downs (country-risk provi-
sions and amortisation of goodwill) was an additional element contributing to a further increase 
in the ROE.
The comparison with European banks, based on December 2003 data, once again highlights 
the solid position of Spanish institutions in terms of profitability. The ROE of Spanish institu-
tions is significantly higher than the European average as a result of wider margins, the growth 
in activity, similar operating expenses, in relative terms, and greater efficiency.
Solvency The solvency ratios deteriorated slightly, with capital growing somewhat less than require-
ments. Tier 1 capital increased as a result of the improvement in bank profits, with the con-
sequent rise in reserves, despite the increase in goodwill and the relative stability of prefer-
ence shares. Tier 2 capital grew as a result of the acceleration in the issuance of 
subordinated debt. The growth of activity and, especially, of credit led to an increase in risk-
weighted assets.
The cyclical position of the Spanish economy remained favourable, leading to a reduction in 
the requirements for specific loan loss provisions. As a result, the statistical fund continued to 
grow, enabling a significant number of institutions to reach the fund ceiling.
In comparison with other European countries, the total solvency ratio and the tier-1 ratio of 
Spanish credit institutions are slightly below average. This situation is explained by the strong 
growth of lending activity and, therefore, of risk-weighted assets in Spain. Spanish prudential 
provisioning requirements should also be mentioned, a factor that significantly helps to 
strengthen the stability of the Spanish financial system.
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In short, the growth of business, especially in Spain, and the cost-containment drive have 
borne fruit in terms of an acceleration in profits and a significant increase in the return on eq-
uity. However, the strong growth in lending linked to the property sector means that the institu-
tions must closely manage their credit risk.
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I Banking risks
I.1 Introduction to 
Spanish deposit 
institutions’ risk
The conclusions drawn from an analysis of the consolidated balance sheets of Spanish de-
posit institutions are similar to those reflected in the last FSR. In particular, the dynamism of 
business in Spain, together with the increase, albeit modest, in the total assets of foreign busi-
ness, for the first time since 2001, is responsible for the acceleration in the total assets of de-
posit institutions. The growth in business in Spain is largely explained by financing to the pri-
vate sector, which again grew at higher rates than the most traditional bank liabilities. Also, 
doubtful assets fell and the doubtful assets ratios are, once again at historical lows.
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE 
SHEETS1
The total assets of Spanish deposit institutions continued to follow the trend identified in the 
last FSR. Their growth rate in June 2004 (12.7%) was 6.6 pp up on the same period a year 
earlier2 and the highest recorded since mid-2001 (Table I.1).
This growth is basically explained by business in Spain. With a weight of somewhat more than 
85% of total assets, business in Spain increased by 14.9%, 4 pp more than in June 2003. At 
the same time, the total assets of foreign business increased for the first time since mid-2001 
(by 1.4%, as against –12.7% in June 2003). The relative improvement in the economic and 
financial situation in Latin America and the trend in the region’s main currencies against the 
euro help to explain this behaviour.
That said, the disparity between the growth rates in Spain and abroad means that the relative 
weight of foreign business in the consolidated balance sheets of Spanish deposit institutions 
fell once again, from 16.5% to 14.8%. A new low was therefore reached, confirming the down-
ward trend that has followed a period of intense expansion by Spanish banks in Latin America. 
At its peak, in December 2000, foreign business accounted for 27.6% of total assets.
As regards the structure of assets, the relative weight of financing to the private sector contin-
ued to increase, and now represents 59.8% of total assets, almost 2 pp more than in the same 
period a year earlier (Chart I.1A). The growth rate of this item (16.6%) was the highest since 
mid-2001 and 5.5 pp above last year’s rate.
The performance of financing to the private sector was largely attributable to business in 
Spain, where it grew by 17.8% (4 pp more than in June 2003), driven by the vigorous growth 
in secured lending. Although such lending has slowed slightly (by 13 bp), it is still growing at 
a rate of over 20%. In foreign business, confirming the trend identified in the last FSR, financ-
ing to the private sector also grew, following the declines that had been recorded from end-
2001. In particular, growth of 7.3% was recorded in June 2004, as against a fall of 5.2% last 
year.
Total doubtful assets declined at a rate of 14.6%, compared with the increase of 6.8% re-
corded in the same period of the previous year. This behaviour was attributable to both busi-
ness in Spain (–5.6%, against 4.8%) and foreign business (–28.9%, against 10.1%), in both 
cases confirming the decline seen in December 2003.
1. The data presented in Table I.1 relating to dates prior to June 2004 may have changed slightly from those published 
in previous editions of the FSR owing to revisions made by the institutions themselves and to changes in the composition 
of consolidated groups. These minor changes in no way alter the conclusions drawn earlier. 2. Unless otherwise stated, 
amounts relate to June 2004 and comparisons are always between that month and June 2003.
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The growth of financing to the private sector, together with the decline in doubtful assets, led 
to a further reduction in the doubtful assets ratio, which is now 4 bp below 1%. This was at-
tributable both to business in Spain and foreign business, although significant differences 
persist between them (Chart I.1B). However, these differences have narrowed from their peak 
in December 2002. This may be, among other factors, because of the relative improvement in 
the Latin American situation, as well as the management improvements introduced by Spanish 
institutions.
Continuing a trend that began in mid-2001, the relative weight of financing to general govern-
ment fell. However, after falling by 2.5% last year, financing to general government increased 
by 3.2%, so that, as reported in the last edition of the FSR, the rate turned positive. That said, 
the magnitude of this change was smaller than it would have been, because the growth in 
foreign business, for the first time since end-2001, was offset by the slowdown in business in 
Spain. In foreign business, the relative weight of financing to general government rose to 
22.8% of total business, cutting short the ongoing decline from December 2000, when it ac-
counted for 45.6% of total business.
The equity portfolio grew at a rate of 23.7%, the highest since end-2000, as a result of its 
behaviour in Spanish business. Its relative weight rose by 36 bp. The possibility, mentioned in 
the previous FSR, of a change in trend in this item against the background of a more stable 
stock market seems to have been confirmed.
TABLE I.1CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET
Deposit institutions
SOURCE: Banco de España.
ASSETS JUN-04
(€m)
RELATIVE 
WEIGHT IN 
JUN-04
CH.
J-03/J-02
(%)
CH.
J-04/J-03
(%)
LIABILITIES
JUN-04
(€m)
RELATIVE 
WEIGHT IN 
JUN-04
CH.
J-03/J-02
(%)
CH.
J-04/J-03
(%)
Cash on hand and on deposit at 
Central Banks 29,207  1.7 5.3 8.6 Central Banks 31,147  1.8 0.1 31.8
Due from credit institutions 190,781  11.1 4.7 6.1 Due to credit institutions 317,320  18.4 9.3 22.3
Credit to general government 49,306  2.9 –9.6 4.7 Credit from general government 49,349  2.9 9.6 7.9
Credit to private sector 961,860  55.8 11.6 15.4 Customer deposits 867,145  50.3 4.3 9.4
Fixed-income portfolio 278,230  16.1 0.9 15.3 Marketable debt securities 170,074  9.9 21.4 28.4
Doubtful  assets 10,460  0.6 6.8 –14.6 Other liabilities 50,629  2.9 9.3 2.3
Equity portfolio 70,528  4.1 1.3 23.7 Accrual accounts 19,808  1.1 –13.2 –8.5
Property and equipment 25,082  1.5 –5.4 –0.3 Provisions 54,204  3.1 –2.7 3.7
Goodwill in consolidation 18,330  1.1 –16.0 7.0 Negative difference in consolidation 196  0.0 67.9 –10.7
Intangible assets 1,499  0.1 –8.3 –4.8 Subordinated debt 35,238  2.0 7.4 6.2
Own stakes and shareholders 408  0.0 –52.6 81.0 Minority interest 20,031  1.2 1.2 –4.7
Other assets 51,416  3.0 1.4 0.3 Capital stock 9,080  0.5 2.7 3.6
Accrual accounts 22,846  1.3 –11.1 –4.0 Reserves 68,766  4.0 5.1 9.8
Prior year’s losses at the controlling 
entity 699  0.0 17.9 23.4 Reserves at consolidated companies 24,062  1.4 1.9 15.5
Losses at consolidated companies 14,210  0.8 8.7 12.7 Net income (+/–) 7,814  0.5 7.7 14.8
Group 7,065  0.4 11.0 19.4
TOTAL ASSETS 1,724,926  100 6.1 12.7 TOTAL LIABILITIES 1,724,926  100 6.1 12.7
Memorandum item
Financing to private sector 1,032,362  59.8 11.1 16.6
Financing to general government 230,297  13.4 –2.5 3.2
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Despite its growth of 7%, following a 16% fall last year, goodwill continues to represent around 
1% of total assets.
Turning to liabilities, the rate of growth of residents’ deposits, as in the period covered by the 
last FSR, continued to accelerate, from 4.3% in June 2003 to 9.4%. However, as this item 
grew more slowly than total assets its relative weight fell by 1.5 pp to 50.3%. In addition, it 
continued to grow more slowly than financing to the private sector.
In line with what has been noted in previous reports, to compensate for the behaviour of resi-
dents’ deposits, the rate of growth of foreign interbank financing accelerated, by 13 pp, as did 
that of marketable debt securities, which grew by almost 7 pp more than a year earlier. The 
relative weight of both items increased, to 18.4% and 9.9% of total assets, respectively.
Subordinated debt, meanwhile, grew with respect to June 2003, but less vigorously (1.2 pp 
less). Its relative weight, therefore, continued to decline, to below its December 2001 levels. 
Preference shares also declined in relative importance, since their rate of change was again 
negative, although close to zero (–0.6%).
Finally, the favourable behaviour of Spanish institutions’ profits, already mentioned in the previ-
ous FSR, was confirmed by group net income, which grew by 19.4%.
ASSET MANAGEMENT As well as offering claims on banks, deposit institutions provide asset management services, 
through different companies, to their customers. In June 2004, the assets managed by de-
posit institutions’ management companies totalled €343,300 million. Their rate of growth with 
respect to June 2003 was 25.1% and their annual average growth rate over the last five years 
10.8%. However, the growth in assets managed has not been uniform across the countries of 
residence of the deposit institutions’ management companies. Between June 1999 and June 
2004, the total assets managed by those based in Spain fell by 9 pp in favour of those based 
abroad; in June 2004 the former managed 82.5% of total assets, down from 91.5% five years 
previously. Management companies in Latin America gained 5.3 pp to account for 12.9% of 
total managed assets, those in the rest of the former European Union (EU-15) gained 1.2 
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points to account for 1.6% and those in the other developed countries gained their current 
share of 2.8% (Chart I.2A).
The selling by institutions of shares in portfolio investment institutions, pension funds and se-
curitisation SPVs competes to attract customer savings with bank products (sight accounts, 
time deposits, debt securities, etc.). For deposit institutions, managed assets represent 24% 
of all the funds raised from customers (i.e. non-interbank interest-bearing liabilities plus man-
aged assets). However, there are significant differences between banks and savings banks. In 
the former this percentage was 33% in June 2004, while in savings banks it was 12.3%. Ac-
cordingly, banks are more specialised in asset management. This may be partly attributable to 
the demands of their customers and partly to their business strategy.
CHART I.2ASSET MANAGEMENT
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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The share of banks in all the assets managed by banks and savings banks has fluctuated at 
around 80% over the past five years. This share falls to 77% if we consider only those assets 
managed by Spanish management companies (Chart I.2B).
In terms of the type of institution managed (Charts I.2C and I.2D), and taking all the countries 
together, in June 2004, capital market mutual funds continued to account for the highest weight 
of the assets managed both by the management companies of banks (45% of the total), and by 
those of savings banks (52.3% of the total), despite the fall in their relative weight since June 
1999. This relative importance in both groups is mainly attributable to their weight in Spain. For 
banks, the next most important type of institution is pension funds which account for 20.7% of 
the total. Of these, somewhat more than 56% are managed in Latin America. For savings banks, 
meanwhile, the next type of institution in order of importance are mortgage securitisation SPVs 
with 13.2% of the total managed assets, owing to their weight in Spain, although banks actu-
ally manage more assets in Spain through these institutions than do savings banks. The other 
types of institution, mostly non-mortgage securitisation SPVs, account for 10.2% of managed 
assets in banks and 3.6% in savings banks and their management companies are mainly lo-
cated in Spain. Finally, the assets managed by money market funds are practically all Spanish.
In the Spanish market, the share of the assets of portfolio investment institutions, securitisation 
SPVs and pension funds managed by the management companies of deposit institutions has 
not varied with respect to the situation described in the previous FSR. They manage around 
20% of the total assets of money market funds, 73% of those of open-end investment com-
panies, 27% of those of closed-end investment companies, 48% of those of securitisation 
SPVs and 50% of those of pension funds.
INSURANCE COMPANIES In Spain, in the economic and financial groups made up of deposit institutions and insurance 
undertakings, also known as financial conglomerates (bancassurance in international terminol-
ogy), the latter are generally controlled by the former. More than 90% of the total assets of 
Spanish insurance companies3 are accounted for by sociedades anónimas (public limited 
companies) some of which are controlled by deposit institutions. In this way, Spanish deposit 
institutions diversify their business since the assets and liabilities of insurance companies, es-
pecially those in the life business, are generally savings products with much longer maturities 
than those of banks. Deposit institutions use their branch networks to offer both banking and 
insurance products, thereby extending the range and quality of the services provided to their 
customers, while diversifying their sources of income and increasing their productivity, through 
the generation of scope economies.
Deposit institutions control about 100% of the Spanish insurance companies (except when the 
latter are multigroup companies4) belonging to their economic group, which are the ones this 
FSR focuses on. In addition, they do not control but are associated with and/or have small 
stakes in other insurance companies, which are not considered here.
The Spanish insurance companies controlled by deposit institutions in 2002 (the latest period 
for which data are available), accounted for 40.6% of the total assets of insurance companies 
(which are sociedades anónimas). By business5, they accounted for almost 56% of life, 40.5% 
3. Insurance companies are considered to include, in addition to sociedades anónimas, mutual insurance companies, 
branches of non-EU insurance companies and pure reinsurance companies. 4. Multigroup companies are those whose 
capital is owned by two or more entities, which do not belong to the same group and which jointly manage such 
companies. 5. Insurance sociedades anónimas are classified as life, non-life or mixed (which operate in both the life and 
the non-life businesses). Inclusion in one or the other category is based on their profit and loss account. In a particular 
year, mixed undertakings are those that present both technical life and non-life accounts.
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of mixed and 5.2% of non-life insurance companies’ assets (Chart I.3A). In addition, separat-
ing the activity of all the mixed companies into life and non-life (using for this purpose the life/
non-life breakdown of the net reported reinsurance premiums of mixed undertakings) shows 
that the mixed companies controlled by deposit institutions represent 45% of total mixed life 
business premiums and 2.7% of the non-life. There is therefore a clear specialisation by de-
posit institutions in the life business.
Insurance companies are highly leveraged institutions owing to the large volume of insurance 
technical provisions they require (especially the mathematical provisions required by the life 
business) which are policyholders’ financial savings. Accordingly, their return on assets (ROA) 
is low, in comparison with other less leveraged types of non-financial corporations. Their return 
on equity (ROE) is relatively high. There are differences, in terms of returns, between insurance 
companies as a whole and those controlled by deposit institutions (Charts I.3B and I.3C). 
Those controlled by deposit institutions, with a somewhat higher ROA than that of insurance 
companies as a whole, also have a significantly higher ROE, partly on account of their higher 
leverage.
SOURCES: DGSFP and BE calculation.
CHART I.3INSURANCE COMPANIES
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The solvency margin6 of insurance companies and of those controlled by deposit institutions 
is, in general, much higher than the minimum level or the regulatory minimum requirements. In 
the period 2000-2002, the insurance companies of deposit institutions had a somewhat 
smaller excess to requirements than insurance companies as a whole, since the solvency 
margin of the life business of mixed insurance companies is closer to the minimum level (al-
beit comfortably above it) than in other businesses. (Chart I.3D).
In short, the insurance activity carried out by Spanish deposit institutions through the insur-
ance companies they control shows that their position in the insurance business is solid, both 
in terms of profitability and own funds. This, in turn, reinforces the stability of deposit institu-
tions and, by extension, that of the Spanish financial system as a whole.
EVOLUTION OF RISKS Financing to the resident private sector, according to individual balance sheet data, accelerated 
in the first half of 2004 (16.9% growth in June, as against 14.2% in the same period a year ear-
lier), extending the trend maintained over the last two years. Notable in credit to productive ac-
tivities is the increasing divergence between the growth of financing to construction and property 
development companies (growth of 34.4%) and that to other firms which, despite accelerating in 
the first half of 2004, still failed to reach double figures (9.4%). The significant acceleration in 
credit to firms since the end of 2001 is, almost exclusively, the result of substantial growth in that 
to the construction sector and, in particular, to the property development sector (Chart I.4A).
In the first half of 2004, credit to construction firms accelerated significantly (from 15.1% in 
December 2003 to 22.8% in June 2004), while credit to property developers continued to 
grow at very high rates (44.4% in June 2004) without any sign of a slowdown. In contrast, the 
high rate of growth of credit for house purchase remained relatively steady in the first half of 
this year at 17.1%. This was compatible with a slight acceleration in the financing actually re-
ceived by households for this purpose which, along with loans on the balance sheets of the 
institutions, includes those removed as a result of securitisation. Previous editions of the FSR 
have highlighted the higher credit risk (that gives rise to very high doubtful assets ratios) his-
torically displayed by financing to property firms in Spanish economic downturns.
The growing dichotomy between credit to the construction and property development sector 
and to other firms explains why the change in the former accounts for about two-thirds of the 
growth in total credit to firms in June 2004, up from one-fifth at end-1998 (Chart I.4B). Over 
the same period, the relative weight of credit to construction and property development in-
creased from 11.9% to 19.8% of all credit to firms between these two dates.
As in the periods covered by previous editions of the FSR, doubtful assets ratios continued to 
move favourably, edging down from their December 2003 level. The doubtful assets ratio for 
credit to productive activities stood at 0.8% while that for credit to households was 0.58% (0.30% 
for house purchase and 1.62% for consumption). However, across branches of activity there are 
substantial differences between the level of the ratio (Chart I.4C and I.4D), partly arising from the 
intrinsic characteristics of each of them, but also from the growth rate of credit in recent years. 
Although the doubtful assets ratio for credit to construction and property development is among 
the lowest, the doubtful assets of these sectors are growing apace (11.1% in construction and 
30% in property development in June 2004), but this is offset by the higher growth of credit.
The presence of Spanish deposit institutions abroad continued to edge down during 2004, 
owing to the reduction in assets in Latin America, extending the trend that commenced in 
6. Uncommitted assets, equivalent to the own funds of deposit institutions.
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2002, and despite the increase in their presence in developed countries (Chart I.5A). The ap-
preciation of the euro and the new business strategies, which in the first half focused on build-
ing up the businesses acquired, explain these changes. Since 2002, among the assets in 
which institutions in Latin America (where almost all the external assets that Spanish deposit 
institutions have in emerging countries are located) invest, there has been a decline in the rela-
tive weight of government securities, which has basically been absorbed by interbank assets, 
while the financing to the resident private sector has been relatively stable (Chart I.5B).
The reorientation of external financial assets and the decline in credit risk in Latin America are 
responsible for the decline in the risk profile of the external assets7 of Spanish institutions. In 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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addition, for most countries, sovereign differentials during 2004 have been at their lowest lev-
els in recent years.
The debit balance of Spanish credit institutions with the resident private sector continued to 
increase in the first half of 2004, extending the trend of recent years (Chart I.6A). The imbal-
ance between investment and financing vis-à-vis the resident private sector, as in 2003, was 
basically financed by a greater recourse to the international interbank market, which also 
served to reduce the liabilities with other non-resident sectors. In previous editions of the FSR 
the challenges that this trend in the balance with the resident private sector has posed have 
been analysed in detail, not only from the viewpoint of its medium-term sustainability, but also 
of the impact on the profitability of the institutions.
The cost of liabilities obtained by the institutions differs substantially according to the origin of 
the funds (resident or non-resident) and the instrument (Charts I.6B and C). It is more expen-
sive to raise funds from non-resident creditors or on the interbank market than from residents. 
In the case of residents there are substantial differences according to the instrument. In recent 
years, the financing of the high growth of credit to the resident private sector by raising funds 
on the interbank market or by issuing debt securities and, to a lesser extent, subordinated 
debt has affected the cost structure of bank liabilities (Chart I.6D), which has in turn put pres-
sure on institutions’ margins.
Since the last FSR, stock markets have tended to stagnate, while implied volatilities have been 
low, in Spain and in the rest of Europe and also in the United States.
I.2 Credit risk
I.2.1 IMPACT OF THE 
MACROECONOMIC 
BACKGROUND
a. Spain and the euro area
The latest available euro area data, for Q2, confirm the continuity of the economic upturn from 
end-2003. The quarter-on-quarter rate of change of GDP stood at 0.5%, boosted by the 
United States and the Asian countries, while in year-on-year terms the rate was 2%, up 0.6 pp 
on the previous quarter (Chart I.7). In Spain, the rate of change of GDP, quarter-on-quarter, 
was also 0.5%, while the year-on-year rate of growth, although still higher than in the euro area 
as a whole, fell to 2.6%, down 0.1 pp on Q1.
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In the first half of 2004 there were no significant corrections to any of the developments that 
have been identified in previous editions of the FSR as risk factors for economic growth in 
Spain in the medium term. Household debt continued to grow at high rates, house prices 
still showed no signs of adjusting towards levels closer to those indicated by their long-
term determinants and the inflation differential vis-à-vis the euro area widened again to 
1.1 pp.
Non-financial corporations The results of the corporations that report to the Banco de España Central Balance Sheet 
Data Office (CBSO) were again very favourable in the first half of 2004. Gross operating profit 
grew at a year-on-year rate of 7.2%, similar to the rate recorded in the same period a year 
earlier, and ordinary net profit (which includes financial revenue and financial costs) grew by 
22.5%, well above the rate in the same period of 2003 (12.1%). The decline in financial costs 
and, especially, the increase in financial revenue, which increased by 21.7% owing to the divi-
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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dends obtained from subsidiaries abroad, both contributed to this growth in ordinary net 
profit. By contrast, net profit fell by 9.3%, basically as a result of the fall in extraordinary in-
come. Analysts’ expectations regarding both the short and long-term trend in listed firms’ 
earnings also generally improved.
The good ordinary profit figures meant that the profitability ratios remained high. The ordinary 
returns on investment and on equity both improved, to 7.6% and 10.7%, respectively. In addi-
tion, there was a fall in the percentage of firms for which these indicators were negative. This, 
along with the fresh reduction in the cost of borrowing, meant that the spread between the 
ordinary return on investment and the average cost of borrowed funds widened by 1.2 pp from 
2003 Q1, to 3.7%.
The total financing received by Spanish non-financial corporations (through credit from finan-
cial institutions and securities issuance) accelerated slightly during the first half of 2004, to a 
rate of expansion of around 14% in June, which led to a further increase in aggregate debt 
ratios. In the case of large firms, this indicator fell slightly, as a result of the more expansionary 
behaviour of the denominator of the ratio (gross operating profit plus financial revenue). De-
spite the growth in aggregate debt, the reduction in the cost of debt enabled the related debt 
burden to remain at moderate levels. In fact, it declined slightly with respect to end-2003. Also 
the total debt-burden (interest plus short-term debt) ratio fell somewhat for the firms reporting 
to the CBSO.
The favourable trend in actual and expected company profits, along with the maintenance of 
a solid financial position, which was reflected in a decline in insolvencies, led to a further re-
duction in the credit risk premiums for non-financial corporations on credit derivative mar-
kets.
The last edition of the FSR documented a substantial decline in the debt burden arising from 
interest over the last decade, across all branches of activity, which was related to the fall in 
interest rates prompted by the adoption of the euro. Chart I.8A and B shows the distribution 
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of total bank debt and of doubtful bank debt by brackets of the distribution of the debt burden8 
among Spanish non-financial corporations for the period 1992-20029.
The distribution of bank debt by debt-burden percentiles is very uniform (Chart I.8A). The 10% 
of firms with the highest debt burden account for around 10% of bank debt. In consequence, 
there do not seem to be any significant differences in the average levels of bank debt between 
firms with different debt burdens.
By contrast, there is a clear relationship between the level of firms’ debt burden and the impact 
of doubtful assets (Chart I.8B). Specifically, the 50% of firms with a lower ratio of profits to fi-
nancial costs, which account for around half of bank debt, account for nearly 90% of doubtful 
bank debt. Moreover, this relationship is not proportional since, on average, the 10% of firms 
with a lower market capitalisation-to-debt ratio account for around 30% of doubtful bank debt. 
Accordingly, the debt burden (or the market capitalisation relative to debt) of non-financial 
corporations is a very significant indicator of their financial situation. As already discussed in 
the last edition of the FSR, the level of the debt burden of Spanish firms is low from a ten-year 
perspective.
Households In the first half of 2004, households continued to resort heavily to borrowing. In fact the rate of 
change of household borrowing increased to around 20%. This growth stemmed from the ac-
celeration in financing for house purchase (which includes both loans on bank balance sheets 
and those removed therefrom as a result of their securitisation) and the maintenance of the 
rate of growth of credit for consumption and other purposes.
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presas” included in issue number 7 of Estabilidad Financiera. 9. The information is obtained by contrasting the firm-
level data provided by the Mercantile Register and the Central Credit Register (CCR). In particular, the accounting data 
have been taken from the Mercantile Register, while the information on total bank debt and doubtful debt have been 
taken from the CCR. After applying various filters to the accounting information to exclude firms reporting inconsistent 
information, the database used to prepare Chart I.8 contains information for, on average, over 100,000 firms (the mini-
mum being 30,000 firms in 1992, and the maximum some 165,000 in 2000).
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As a result of this behaviour of financing, and also of the more moderate growth in household 
gross disposable income, levels of indebtedness reached 95% of household GDI in June 
(Chart I.9). The related debt burden also increased relative to GDI for the third quarter running, 
despite the reduction in the portion corresponding to interest payments and reached the high 
levels recorded in 2001. Meanwhile, household wealth increased again in the first half of the 
year, basically as a result of the rise in house prices, since net financial wealth remained rela-
tively stable.
The aggregate financial position of households remained solid. However, as pointed out in the 
last edition of the FSR, the high level of their indebtedness has increased their sensitivity to 
adverse shocks and, also, the very high proportion of floating rate loans has increased the 
sensitivity of the debt burden to changes in the cost of debt. In addition, as seen in Box I.1, 
the available disaggregated information shows a high dispersion in the financial position 
across households. Accordingly, the ability of a certain proportion of households to meet the 
payments on debts contracted would be lower than the aggregate indicators suggest.
b. Rest of the world In the international economy, the rate of economic activity increased across the board in the 
first half of 2004. This positive performance led to a fresh upward revision in growth expecta-
tions for the year as a whole to close to 5%, notably higher than the 3.9% rate recorded in 
2003. The economic recovery was particularly marked in the first quarter, especially in the 
United States and in the Asian economies, particularly China and Japan. There was also a 
strong upturn in activity in other emerging areas such as Latin America. The higher rate of 
economic growth was accompanied by more buoyant world trade and a recovery in industrial 
production. Subsequently, in the second quarter, the data relating to the United States, Japan 
and, to a much lesser extent, China, the world economy’s main engines, exhibited some 
weakness, without changing the central scenario of notable growth for the year as a whole. 
Inflationary pressures increased slightly, although they remain at moderate levels, despite the 
strong rise in commodity and oil prices, which could firm. The behaviour in the coming months 
of the demand and supply factors that affect the price of oil will be important to assess the 
impact on world economic activity of its current levels.
In the United States, gross domestic product grew in 2004 Q2 at a year-on-year rate of 4.7%, 
as against 5.0% in Q1. The main reason for this slowdown was a significant reduction in the 
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The European Community Household Panel (ECHP), compiled by 
Eurostat at the Community level, includes a set of variables that ena-
bles certain aspects of the financial position of households to be 
studied in some detail. For the available sample period (1994-2000), 
the panel enables the statistical distribution of the debt burden as-
sociated with the acquisition of a first home, defined as the ratio be-
tween the payments linked to loans for such purpose (repayment of 
capital and interest) and the total net income of the household unit, to 
be analysed. It is also possible to examine the relationship between 
the debt burden and factors that may influence the ability of house-
holds to pay their debts, such as their income, wealth (approximated 
using capital and rental income) and the age of the household head.
Analysing the distribution of the debt burden of Spanish house-
holds on the basis of the ECHP shows that it is widely dispersed. 
More than 75% of the households interviewed did not have any 
debt on the houses they were living in, though this percentage 
trended downwards in the period considered, while approximately 
10% of those that did have loans of this type devoted more than 
40% of their income to their repayment1. It is also interesting to note 
that the debt burden of the representative indebted household (that 
whose ratio coincides with the median of the distribution) was more 
than four times the sector mean. These results illustrate the rele-
vance of using microeconomic data to characterise more precisely 
the financial position of those households relevant to the analysis of 
financial stability. As is well known, the emphasis in such analyses 
should be on the distribution tails rather than on their mean val-
ues.
The ECHP also enables the profile of households with the largest fi-
nancial burdens to be characterised. As Table 1 shows, the 10% of 
household units with a loan for house purchase that, in the period 
analysed, had the highest debt burden, tended to be concentrated in 
the population segments with comparatively low levels of income and 
wealth. In principle, this restricts their ability to pay their debts in the 
event of adverse changes in interest rates or in their income. How-
ever, the heads of such households were relatively young, so that the 
potential growth of their income can generally be considered higher. 
This would be conducive to their access to additional financing in 
credit markets in the event that any of the unfavourable develop-
ments referred to above take place.
1. For more details, see “La carga financiera de las familias españolas: un primer análisis 
desagregado”, Banco de España, Boletín Económico, June 2004 issue.
TABLE 1PROFILE OF THE HOUSEHOLD WITH THE HIGHEST DEBT BURDEN (ABOVE THE 90TH PERCENTILE
OF THE DISTRIBUTION): TOTAL INCOME, CAPITAL AND RENTAL INCOME, AND AGE OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD
a. 25p, 50p, 75p and 90p indicate, respectively, the 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th precentiles of the distribution of the variable analysed for 
the whole population.
1994 1997 2000
TOTAL INCOME (a)
Income <25p 46.9 71.8 46.5
Income between 25p and 50p 21.8 10.8 34.4
Income between 50p and 75p 25.3 14.4 11.4
Income >75p 6.0 3.1 7.8
CAPITAL AND RENTAL INCOME (a)
Capital and rental income <75p 90.5 91.1 82.5
Cap. and rental income betw. 75p and 90p 2.8 6.9 14.1
Cap. And rental income >90p 6.7 2.1 3.4
AGE OF FAMILY HEAD
Under 35 32.3 35.4 34.0
35-55 50.2 50.4 49.8
Over 55 17.5 14.2 16.2
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growth of private consumption. However, the available data for Q3 seem to point to a recovery 
in consumer demand. Business investment showed notable growth (12.1%) in Q2, buoyed by 
positive corporate earnings figures and favourable financing conditions. The current account 
deficit continued to deteriorate, owing to strong import growth, to stand at 5.7% in Q2. Mean-
while, the budget deficit could be 3.6% of GDP at the end of the fiscal year, despite the posi-
tive behaviour of revenues attributable, in turn, to the strong economic growth.
The risk scenarios facing the US economy are: a sudden correction to the dollar and long-term 
interest rates, prompted by the magnitude of the external and budget imbalances; a sharp fall 
in domestic demand, in response to hesitant employment growth and the high level of house-
hold debt; and an unexpected deterioration in inflation that changes the expected pattern of 
gradual official interest rate rises. However, there are no signs that any of these scenarios has 
a significant probability of materialising in the short term.
In Japan, GDP growth in 2004 Q1 continued to accelerate, reaching 5.9% year-on-year. This 
growth was based on the positive trend in investment, private consumption and exports. Sub-
sequently, in Q2, output growth fell to 4.2%, owing to the negative contribution of investment. 
In any case, despite the slowdown, the growth prospects for the year as a whole remained 
positive, with expected growth of 4.2%.
In China, the rate of activity was very high; GDP grew by 9.6% year-on-year in Q2, as against 
9.9% in the previous quarters. Although the July industrial production and imports data indi-
cated a further moderate cooling, the rate of activity is still above potential, against a back-
ground in which consumer price inflation has risen to 5.3%, from 3.2% at the beginning of the 
year.
In Latin America, economic activity accelerated sharply in the first half of 2004 (Chart I.10A and 
B). GDP grew by 5.5% (year-on-year) in Q2, the same rate as in Q1. This positive performance 
was a result of the tendency for the year-on-year growth rates of those countries whose activ-
ity had rebounded strongly in previous quarters, following their respective economic crises 
(Venezuela, Argentina and Uruguay), to normalise and of the fact that growth rates in the other 
countries were sustained or increased slightly. There was thus a narrowing of the dispersion of 
growth rates, which in all cases exceeded 3.5%. The momentum of the recovery in Brazil is 
particularly notable, with year-on-year growth rising from practically nil at end-2003 to 5.7% in 
Q2.
A notable aspect of recent economic developments was the strength of domestic demand, 
across all of its components, following a long period of slackness caused by the economic 
adjustment arising from past financial turbulences. The lesser importance of external de-
mand was attributable to the recovery in imports, since exports remained vigorous, in line 
with the world expansion and, linked to the latter, with the sound behaviour of commodity 
prices.
Inflation moved down and then up again; after breaking through the 5% floor in the first quarter 
for the area as a whole, inflation subsequently bounced back vigorously to above 6% in July. 
The gradual firming of domestic demand and the deterioration in inflation expectations led to 
a general tightening of monetary policies, especially from Q3, while fiscal policies were relaxed 
somewhat.
In Q2, in the region as a whole, bank credit to the private sector grew at positive real rates 
(Chart I.10C), largely due to the positive growth in Brazil (above 4%) and Mexico (above 5%), 
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in parallel with the greater buoyancy of economic activity. The stabilisation in Argentina, follow-
ing the collapse of credit in the wake of the crisis, also contributed to this overall improve-
ment.
Following a prolonged period during which sovereign spreads had been narrowing, the first 
half of 2004 saw two bouts of instability that momentarily interrupted this process (Chart 
I.10D). The first occurred in mid-January and was moderate and temporary. Subsequently, in 
mid-April, at the time of the upward revision in market expectations regarding rises in official 
US interest rates, investors reacted by unwinding positions in the debt markets of emerging 
economies.
Specifically, for Latin America as a whole, the deterioration meant that the regional spread 
reached 700 bp in May, almost 230 bp above the low recorded in mid-January. Brazil and 
Colombia were the most affected countries; their spreads widened by around 60%, owing to 
the deterioration in their fiscal situation. However, the turbulence was temporary and from late 
May sovereign spreads in Latin American countries narrowed notably.
SOURCES: Central banks, IFS service of the IMF, JP Morgan-Chase and BE calculation.
CHART I.10ACTIVITY, CREDIT AND RISK IN LATIN AMERICA
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Despite the improvement in economic activity, rating agencies were cautious about raising 
sovereign credit ratings. Among the countries classified as “investment grade”, Chile’s rating 
was raised. As regards the rest of the countries, only Peru’s rating was raised and the Do-
minican Republic’s was lowered. In Q3, however, the improved climate on emerging financial 
markets led to upward revisions in the ratings of Brazil, Venezuela and Uruguay.
I.2.2 IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONS’ 
CREDIT POLICY
Credit growth
The acceleration in financing to the resident private sector since the last edition of the FSR is 
attributable to non-mortgage financing (Chart I.11A). However, the growth rate of mortgage 
credit was higher than that of other instruments, although it has stabilised over the last year 
and a half (21.1% in June 2004). Among other instruments, the acquisition of fixed-income 
securities recorded higher growth (59.2%), but its relative weight in total financing is low (3.5% 
in June 2004). Trade credit, personal loans and credit accounts also accelerated during 2004. 
An analysis of the possible uses of mortgage credit is presented in Box I.2.
Credit for house purchase slowed in 2004 Q2 (to 17.1%), following the strong acceleration 
around the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004. Even so, it continued to grow much faster 
than credit for consumption (Chart I.11B). In June 2004 the growth rates of credit for house 
purchase, for productive activities and total credit practically converged. As already discussed 
in the introductory section, the growth of credit to firms is strongly influenced by the property 
sector. In the last two years the growth of credit to property developers has risen from 20% to 
45%. A not inconsiderable number of institutions have seen their portfolios of loans to devel-
opers increase very significantly in a short space of time (Table I.2). For example, in just two 
years, 72 institutions with a relative weight, in terms of total credit, of around 40%, at least 
doubled their portfolio of loans to the property sector; of these, 26 at least tripled their portfo-
lio and 15 increased it more than fivefold. Previous editions of the FSR have highlighted the 
high credit risk displayed by this sector in periods of slower economic growth and, therefore, 
the need to tighten up the acceptance, selection and monitoring of borrowers.
Asset securitisation The absolute amounts of (mortgage and other) assets securitised by deposit institutions have 
continued to increase substantially in 2004. The amount of covered bonds (cédulas hipote-
carias) also increased substantially in Q1, but declined slightly in Q2. This is the first reduction 
in two years, a period characterised by strong growth, in which commercial banks multiplied 
their stock of covered bonds almost fivefold (to €30 billion) while savings banks, which are 
more familiar with this product, doubled theirs (to about €22 billion).
In relative terms, total securitised assets and covered bonds represent 11.7% of lending to the 
resident private sector, almost twice their relative weight two years earlier (Chart I.12A). Mort-
gages predominate among the assets securitised, owing to the limited securitisation of other 
assets by savings banks. In the case of commercial banks, mortgages and other assets have 
a similar weight.
Naturally, a sustained increase in asset securitisation will eventually affect the measurement of 
credit growth. If we add the amount of securitisation by instrument to the credit to the private 
resident sector on the balance sheet then, as at the end of the period, the rate of growth of 
total credit rises by some two percentage points and that of mortgage credit by around three 
points, while in the case of other credit there is virtually no impact (Chart I.12B). Although the 
levels of the growth rates are higher, the trends are similar10.
10. As mentioned in the last edition of the FSR, the new accounting standards are not going to permit the removal of 
securitised assets from balance sheets unless there is a substantial transfer of risk.
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Risk profile of the credit portfolio Between June 2003 and June 2004, the risk profile of Spanish deposit institutions declined. 
The reduction was greatest in the case of commercial banks (from 0.4% to 0.38%), although 
savings banks had a lower level (0.34% in June 2004). This reduction (Chart I.13A and B) 
basically stems from the decline in the relative weight of medium-high risk assets (unsecured 
credit to firms) in favour of medium-low risk assets (credit with non-mortgage collateral, with 
the amount financed being less than 80% of the appraisal value). It should be pointed out that 
there is a substantial difference in quality between these two types of collateral, in terms of the 
incentives to comply with the loan obligations and of the amounts recovered in the event of 
default.
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TABLE I.2GROWTH OF FINANCING TO PROPERTY DEVELOPERS
SOURCE: Banco de España.
NUMBER
WEIGHT IN CREDIT 
TO RESIDENT 
PRIVATE SECTOR
WEIGHT IN CREDIT 
TO PROPERTY 
DEVELOPMENT
Institutions without operations in the period 69 1.3
Institutions not operating in 2002 13 0.7 3.0
Institutions whose growth rate
between June 2002 and June 2004 was:
– Negative 47 4.3 0.8
– 0-50% 37 8.0 4.2
– 50-75% 19 39.5 39.1
– 75-100% 9 8.2 9.2
– 100-200% 46 25.1 24.4
– 200-300% 6 5.8 7.3
– 300-400% 5 4.1 7.3
– Over 400% 15 3.2 4.8
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There is a very significant negative relationship between the rate of change of GDP (the cyclical 
position of the economy) and the probability of collateral being required for a loan to a firm11. 
In other words, during economic upturns institutions reduce their collateral requirements while 
they increase them in less favourable times. The change in the risk profile over the past year, 
at least in the case of lending to firms, shows that they are increasing the number of secured 
USES OF MORTGAGE CREDIT TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND THEIR POTENTIAL REPERCUSSIONS BOX I.2
Mortgage credit granted by deposit institutions to the non-financial 
private sector consists of mortgage-secured credit granted to house-
holds and non-financial corporations not only for the purchase of 
housing and real estate but also for any other use.
The relative importance of mortgage credit not linked to property 
transactions is relevant from the viewpoint of financial stability, be-
cause this type of credit strengthens the relationship between 
changes in property prices and the spending and borrowing deci-
sions of households and non-financial corporations. As a result, its 
growth may affect the situation of these sectors and, thus, that of the 
supplier of this financing, i.e. the banking system. For example, the 
co-existence of excessively buoyant house prices with a relatively 
aggressive lending policy, on the part of credit institutions, may stimu-
late the use of mortgage credit to finance consumption that otherwise 
would not have taken place. In such circumstances, a downward 
adjustment to property prices may have stronger macroeconomic 
effects and may affect the financial position of households and firms 
which, in the expansionary phase of the cycle, encouraged by the 
higher value of their property wealth, borrowed excessively, when 
they would not otherwise have done so.
In some countries, such as the United States and the United King-
dom, the financing of consumption through mortgage-secured loans, 
on which there is ample information, has been highly relevant, not 
only to explain the growth of this type of credit, but also to sustain 
consumption during economic downturns. However, in the euro area, 
there are as yet no harmonised statistics to enable the different uses 
of mortgage credit to be analysed. In fact, it is only possible to ana-
lyse the total volume of credit linked to the property sector, more 
specifically, credit for house purchase, with or without mortgage se-
curity1.
In Spain, institutions only supply information on credit to households 
for house purchase, with or without mortgage security, and on the 
credit granted to non-financial corporations in the construction and 
property development sectors which, it is generally assumed, is all 
invested in the property sector. Accordingly, it is not possible, with the 
information available, to obtain the volume of mortgage credit grant-
ed by institutions to finance non-property related activities. In the 
case of households, any mortgage credit used for purposes other 
than the purchase and renovation of dwellings is included in con-
sumer credit or other loans, in accordance with the classification es-
tablished in current accounting regulations.
Mortgage credit for non-property-related uses is one of the main 
ways owners of real property can mobilise such wealth to finance 
their current spending without needing to carry out transactions in 
the property market (mortgage equity withdrawal). The financing of 
consumption by mortgage credit has advantages both for borrowers 
and lenders; the existence of security involves a lower cost for bor-
rowers and a lower credit and capital consumption risk for lenders.
The use of mortgage credit for uses other than the acquisition of 
property has, in some countries and in certain periods, been con-
strained by legal rules regarding the creation and transmission of 
mortgages and their tax treatment. Currently, in most EU countries it 
is possible to use mortgage credit to finance spending not related to 
the property market2. However, only in the United Kingdom and in the 
Netherlands is it possible to quantify the relative importance of this 
practice3.
In Spain, the overall ratio between credit granted to households for 
house purchase and households’ net investment in property would 
suggest that the mortgage credit used to finance consumption has, 
up until now, not been very significant4. Notwithstanding this, the 
supply by Spanish deposit institutions of products, essentially of two 
types, that permit this type of financing is becoming progressively 
more important. In some cases, the products offered enable credit to 
be obtained, with the borrower’s habitual residence as collateral, for 
up to 80% of its value (in some cases subject to an absolute limit of 
€150,000) to finance any need other than the purchase of housing, 
with terms of 10-15 years and with a choice of interest rate condi-
tions. In other cases, institutions offer products that enable the repaid 
portion of a mortgage loan originally granted for house purchase to 
be used to finance other kinds of spending, albeit with limits on terms 
and drawdowns in some cases. Although the relative importance of 
this type of practice has not yet been very great, there are signs that 
it has risen in recent years, so that developments should be moni-
tored.
2. ECB (2003), Structural Factors in the EU Housing Markets and European Mortgage Fed-
eration (2002), Efficiency of Mortgage Collateral in the European Union. 3. Bank of England 
(2001), “Mortgage Equity Withdrawal and Consumption”. Quarterly Bulletin, Spring and De 
Nederlandsche Bank (2003), “Financial Behaviour of Dutch Households”, Quarterly Bulletin, 
September. 4. Banco de España (2003). “¿Aprovechan los hogares la revalorización de su 
riqueza inmobiliaria para financiar un aumento del consumo?”. Boletín Económico, March.
1. See Regulation (EC) No 2423/2001 of the European Central Bank of 22 November 
2001.
11. A more detailed analysis can be found in the forthcoming Banco de España Working Paper by G. Jiménez, V. Salas 
and J. Saurina (2004): “Determinants of collateral”.
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transactions. From a longer time perspective (Chart I.13C) one sees an acceleration in the 
relative weight of secured transactions during economic downturns and a slowdown, or even 
fall, in this relative weight during upturns (the correlation coefficient between the change in 
GDP and the percentage of secured transactions is -0.64, significant at the 1% level).
Doubtful assets The absolute value of total doubtful assets of the individual institutions continued to decline. 
Not only did doubtful assets vis-à-vis the non-resident sector and credit institutions decline, 
but also the doubtful assets of the resident private sector, which account for around 85% of 
the total doubtful assets of deposit institutions, declined slightly (Chart I.14A and B), against a 
background of significant growth in economic activity in Spain and low interest rates.
The breakdown of the growth of doubtful assets of the resident private sector, between firms 
and households and the various segments within these two categories (Chart I.14C), shows 
that doubtful assets are only increasing significantly in the construction and property develop-
ment and hotels and restaurants sectors. This growth has not affected the doubtful assets 
ratios since the growth in credit to these sectors was higher.
The distribution of the doubtful assets ratio of the resident private sector continued to improve, 
showing that the decline in doubtful assets (and also the growth in credit) has been wide-
spread among Spanish deposit institutions (Chart I.14D). Although 101 institutions have a 
doubtful assets ratio of more than 1%, their relative weight in credit to the resident private sec-
tor is very low (10.8%), which reinforces the stability of the Spanish banking system.
The growth of bank credit and economic activity are closely and positively related to one an-
other; in other words, the financing extended by deposit institutions is procyclical. However, 
there are also theoretical arguments (disaster myopia, herding behaviour, agency problems, 
the institutional memory hypothesis) why bank lending may be excessively procyclical. Such 
behaviour, characterised by a relaxation of the institutions’ lending policy standards (accept-
ance, concession, risk monitoring and transaction conditions, including the term, collateral 
and risk premium) in economic upturns, gives rise to very low doubtful assets ratios in such 
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phases which, when the cycle turns, rise considerably, highlighting the errors in the lending 
policy during the upturn. These errors may remain latent for a long period. If very marked, 
these procyclical elements in lending are one of the greatest threats to the stability of a finan-
cial system.
In Spain, there is empirical evidence that a deterioration in the lending policy of institutions, 
after a long lag, eventually translates into an increase in doubtful assets ratios. In fact, there is 
a very significant positive relationship between credit growth today and the doubtful assets 
ratio four years later12. This evidence not only corroborates the theoretical arguments for the 
procyclicality of credit but also forms the basis for a banking regulation policy incorporating 
countercyclical elements, for example, through bad-debt provisioning.
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
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12. A more detailed analysis can be found in the unpublished paper by G. Jiménez and J. Saurina (2004): “Credit cycles, 
credit risk, and prudential regulation”.
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Write-offs Spanish accounting standards require doubtful assets to be written off after three years (six, 
if they are secured by a mortgage) from the default event. Such assets are fully provisioned; 
that is to say, they have been fully written down against the profit and loss account. When 
they are written off they are recorded in memorandum accounts under the heading write-offs. 
The amount of this item diminishes if the amount owed is recovered (such amount being 
credited to the profit and loss account), if fixed assets are transferred to the institution in pay-
ment for the outstanding debt or if the debt is forgiven or the claim expires. If we add write-
offs to the doubtful assets on the balance sheet we obtain a measure of total impaired assets, 
whether or not fully provisioned. When this amount is divided by total lending plus write-offs 
the result can be interpreted as a limit for the ratio of losses due to credit risk (losses that may 
go back many years). Such limit is between 2 and 4 pp higher than the doubtful assets ratio, 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Both in this case and in the rest of the FSR, the density function is approximated by means of 
a kernel estimator.
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depending on the period (Chart I.15). However, the cyclical profile is practically un-
changed13.
I.3 Liquidity risk
MARKETS
The negative trend in liquidity in European electronic debt trading systems was noted in the 
last edition of the FSR and has continued since. The quantitative expression of this worsening 
of liquidity is the weakness of the volumes traded in the MTS and SENAF14 electronic sys-
tems.
An exceptional incident at the beginning of August also tested the liquidity and functioning of 
electronic debt markets in Europe. Two massive order batches entered in different markets by 
one of the world’s largest banks, the first one consisting of instructions to sell and the subse-
quent one of purchase orders, exhausted the liquidity available on the market at that moment. 
Following the execution within the space of one minute of sales amounting to around €11 bil-
lion, of which €455 million corresponded to Spanish bonds, the bank repurchased bonds an 
hour later for around €4 billion.
This incident is being analysed from various angles. The regulators concerned have com-
menced investigations into the background to the matter. From the viewpoint of financial sta-
bility, the incident has two aspects: on one hand, the depth displayed by the market at a par-
ticularly unfavourable time of year seems positive; however, the low level of dealing that 
coexists with this depth calls its quality into question. In this respect, regulators and issuers are 
conscious of the possibilities offered by electronic technology, not only to orchestrate a large-
scale operation like the one described, but also to manage the probability of execution of or-
ders entered into the system.
On the Spanish stock market, the increase in the depth of the IBEX 35, measured in terms of 
the Kyle lambda (a parameter determined by the average amount of cash necessary to move 
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13. If we add fixed assets arising from adjudications and recoveries to the aforesaid ratio, the amount would be practi-
cally the same, at least since 1999, the first date for which this latter item is available. 14. Note that it is this perspective 
(not one based on the prevailing purchase-sale spreads) that enables the liquidity on markets like those mentioned, in 
which members are bound to quote purchase and sale positions within predetermined price ranges, to be better as-
sessed.
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the price of a security or an index by 1%) confirms, over a medium-term perspective, the 
positive trend in liquidity that was identified in terms of traded volumes in previous editions of 
the FSR (Chart I.16). However, the average ranges of the three securities with the highest 
capitalisation on the Spanish market have continued to hold steady.
On the foreign exchange market one of the most significant events in relation to liquidity was 
the growing expansion of prime brokerage, a service provided by a wholesale institution to 
customers who pass to the former the processing of the orders they wish to place on the 
wholesale market. For example, the electronic foreign exchange broker EBS has extended its 
EBS Prime services to hedge funds.
INSTITUTIONS To analyse the liquidity of deposit institutions requires details of the residual maturities of the 
assets and liabilities. Classifying the assets and liabilities by residual maturity enables liquidity 
mismatches to be approximated by term. This is only an approximation because it is difficult 
to know the real residual maturity of certain significant types of assets and liabilities. This is 
the case of sight deposits (current and savings accounts), which can in theory be translated 
into an immediate demand for liquidity, although their average balances usually have a high 
degree of permanence. The early repayment of loans may also distort their average residual 
maturity.
The structure of the assets and liabilities of Spanish deposit institutions, during the past five 
years (Chart I.17A and B), shows the preponderance, as to be expected, of the most liquid 
assets and liabilities (up to one month) followed by transactions at over five years (or with un-
determined maturity)15. The weight of the latter transactions has risen continuously in recent 
years, basically to the detriment of transactions at up to one month. As a result the average 
maturity of the assets16 of commercial banks and savings banks has lengthened, by around 
two years since 1999 (from somewhat less than 4 years to the current 6 years). The lengthen-
ing was most pronounced in the case of credit to the resident private sector (from somewhat 
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15. Liquid assets include the following items: cash at banks, central banks, investment in credit institutions, government 
securities portfolios, trading books and available for sale portfolios (adjusted for unrealised capital losses). Liquid liabilities 
include: central banks, liabilities vis-à-vis credit institutions, tax collection accounts and, as a hypothesis, 25% of all 
other sight liabilities. 16. Institutions report the average maturity of their assets but not their liabilities. To calculate the 
average maturity of the liabilities, it would be necessary to consider a number of hypotheses that would affect the result 
most significantly.
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more than 5 years to 8 years) and, in particular, in secured credit (from 8 years to around 13 
years).
The difference between the assets and liabilities by residual maturity (Chart I.17C), known as 
liquidity mismatches or gaps, shows a short position up to the term of one year that is inverted 
thereafter, with amounts that increase over time but are relatively small in terms of total assets17. 
Both the time structure of the mismatches and their relative amounts are within the limits of 
what might be expected for institutions accustomed to managing their liquidity actively18.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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17. A different hypothesis for sight liabilities (e.g. considering all of them) naturally results in significantly greater short 
positions up to one month and long positions over five years, although the qualitative conclusions regarding the trend 
remain valid. In any case, to consider all sight deposits as withdrawable at a very short term is a hypothesis that seems 
extremely difficult to observe in reality. 18. Note that this analysis is for all deposit institutions, without distinguishing 
between currencies. In particular institutions the mismatches may be more acute.
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I.4 Market risk
MARKETS
International financial developments, especially from April 2004, were driven by the change in 
market expectations regarding the amount and timing of rises in official interest rates in the 
United States. The evidence of a solid rate of activity, improvements in the labour market, 
moderate increases in inflationary pressures and a change in the tone and message of the 
January and March Federal Reserve statements prepared the markets for the adjustment to a 
tighter monetary policy.
These expectations were subsequently confirmed. The first movement in official interest rates 
occurred on 30 June, with an increase of 25 bp, which was followed by two further move-
ments, in July and September, taking the Federal Funds target rate to 1.75%. Market expecta-
tions regarding official interest rates point to a very gradual further increase that would take this 
interest rate to 2% by the end of 2004.
The market reaction during the period to the movement in US official interest rates was very 
orderly and the risks of sudden adjustment associated with the high volume of carry trades 
between very low short-term interest rates, expected to remain at around the same level for 
some time, and more attractive rates on long-term or higher risk assets (both sovereign and 
corporate) did not materialise. Decisive in this orderly reaction were the Federal Reserve’s 
communications policy and the high rate of activity.
In the euro area money markets, interest rates rose during the first half of the year from the 
three-month term, reflecting expectations of a moderate rise in the ECB policy interest rate 
towards the end of the year. However, these movements were partially reversed in Q3.
US long-term interest rates initially rose significantly in response to the readjustment of market 
expectations regarding official rates (Chart I.18A). However, this reaction was temporary and 
there followed a downward trend that took them to around 4%. It is important to note that 
bond market fluctuations, following the initial reaction referred to, were driven more by the 
fundamentals of prices and economic growth than by movements in official rates. Also, the 
behaviour of long-term interest rates differed across geographical areas, more in terms of the 
size of movements than their direction.
In euro area government debt markets, following the downward course of the first few months 
of the year, long-term yields rose between April and June. This movement was smaller, than in 
the United States, however, so the spread between their respective benchmark 10-year bonds 
was again positive. Subsequently, long-term rates fell again, partly reflecting uncertainty over 
world economic growth. In mid-September, the yield on the euro area 10-year benchmark 
bond was 4.08%, 22 bp lower than at end-2003.
Notable on the foreign-exchange markets was the stability of the dollar against the main cur-
rencies, at a level of around 1.20 dollars to the euro and 110 yen to the dollar (Chart I.18B). As 
is well known, the dollar did not react to factors such as the movement in short-term US inter-
est rates, the strong increase in the level and volatility of oil prices and the further deterioration 
in the US external deficit. That said, the dependence of the US on the acquisition, by non-
residents, of private and public fixed-income assets, continued to provide an element of risk 
for the dollar. This risk may be particularly serious for certain economic areas with weak eco-
nomic growth, since they would face a strong appreciation of their currency, against a back-
ground of high oil prices.
Equity markets were relatively slack, and end-August prices were not significantly different 
from those at the beginning of the year (Chart I.19A). The markets seem to have consolidated 
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the strong rise in prices in the second half of 2003. Specifically, euro area stock markets 
showed no definite trend during the first three quarters. Periods of rising prices were followed 
by bouts, linked on various occasions to oil price rises, of falling prices and higher volatilities. 
As at mid-September, the DJ Euro Stoxx was 3% up from end-2003, while its implied volatility 
was moderate. In terms of sectors, the gains in pharmaceuticals and financial services (20.7% 
and 18%, respectively) were notable. In contrast, the technology and cyclical consumption 
sectors showed losses of 16% and 7.5%, respectively.
As regards Spanish stock exchanges, the IBEX 35 rose by 4.9%. The largest rises were in the 
market services sector (22.5%) and in investment and intermediate goods (19.5%), while the 
financial services index fell by 3.5%. This price behaviour, along with the behaviour of com-
pany earnings, meant that movements in PER ratios were small, so that they remained some-
what higher than their historical average values on the main stock markets (Chart I.19B).
In short, as indicated in the last edition of the FSR, and even though the probability does not 
seem high, the main risk for international financial developments is that a change in market 
perceptions regarding the path of official US interest rates could lead to a disorderly deprecia-
tion of the dollar, a rise in long-term interest rates, or a combination of these two effects.
LATIN AMERICA In Latin America, in the first half of 2004, stock market developments were somewhat more 
positive than in the developed countries and in other emerging countries, although they bore 
little relation to the strong rises seen in the second half of 2003. Taking a regional index as 
reference, stock markets in the first half, following significant fluctuations in April and May, fell 
by 3.5% overall. That said, there were substantial differences across countries. Markets rose 
in Mexico by 15%, while they fell in Brazil and Argentina. Since the middle of the year, develop-
ments have been more positive, with widespread gains. As at end-September, with the excep-
tion of Argentina (affected by debt restructuring), all the countries showed gains on the begin-
ning of the year and the regional index was 10% higher (Chart I.20.A).
On foreign exchange markets, developments in the main Latin American currencies relative to 
the euro during 2004 can be divided into three periods (Chart I.20B): the first, to April saw a 
slight appreciation; the second, from mid-April to end-June, saw depreciations almost across 
the board; and the third saw appreciation of almost all the currencies (the Argentine peso and 
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the Mexican peso were the exceptions as they held unchanged). These three periods coin-
cided with the changes in bond markets in the developed countries in response to the change 
in expectations regarding rises in US interest rates. Meanwhile, Venezuela devalued the bolivar 
by 20% in February, after which this currency held steady.
The financial instability of mid-April, associated with the ups and downs of developed mar-
kets, was reflected in a fall in sovereign issuance on the primary debt market. In 2004 Q1, at 
11 billion dollars, the level of issuance was similar to that in the same period of 2003, but in 
Q2 it was only 6.8 billion dollars, which was less than a year earlier. From June, however, the 
market picked up again and this improvement was confirmed by the figures for issuance in 
Q3.
In any event, the weight of Latin America in the total issuance of emerging countries has been 
falling progressively in 2004, not only in the bond market, but also in equity and syndicated 
loan markets. At the country level, the issuance on the primary debt market of Mexico (more 
than 40% of the total) and Brazil (more than 30%) were notable.
It is important to point out that, at least during the first half of 2004, the improvement in the 
financial situation and outlook was not reflected in a recovery of foreign direct investment. 
Flows remained steady in Brazil, at around 10 billion dollars per annum, while the upturn in 
Mexico during the first half (10.3 billion dollars) stemmed from a one-off transaction.
INSTITUTIONS
INTEREST RATE RISK
Current law establishes specific minimum capital requirements for the interest rate risk associ-
ated with the trading book. These requirements can be calculated by means of a standard 
risk-measurement method or by using internal models developed by the institutions, provided 
that such models, which must fulfil certain conditions, have been validated by the Banco de 
España. This latter possibility was opened up in September 2003 by CBE 3/2003.
In the public information supplied by institutions it is possible to find (daily and/or average, 
minimum and maximum) VaR estimates. The methods used to calculate VaRs differ from one 
institution to another, as does the degree to which the information is broken down. As a result, 
it is not easy to base comparisons between institutions on such estimates.
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However, according to the data published in the annual reports of larger deposit institutions, 
the estimated trading book VaRs (with a confidence level of 99% and a one-day horizon) rep-
resent very low percentages of the capital of institutions. On average in 2003, the trading book 
VaRs of large institutions did not, in general, exceed 0.2% of tier 1 capital, and in certain 
cases they did not even exceed 0.1%19. Moreover, according to the trading book VaRs pub-
lished by the major Spanish deposit institutions, there was a general reduction in 2003 in the 
market risk associated with such portfolios.
As is well known, there are no specific minimum capital requirements associated with the 
structural interest rate risk (interest rate risk in the banking book) under current law. However, 
the Supervision Department of the Banco de España monitors and analyses this risk and the 
internal control tools available in each institution. This approach is in line with pillar II of the new 
capital framework announced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS).
In most institutions the main tools to analyse the structural interest rate risk are analysis of the 
maturity gaps in their total assets and liabilities (residual maturity in the case of fixed-rate 
agreements and the time to the next interest-rate review in the case of floating-rate agree-
ments) and analysis of the duration of the assets and liabilities. Institutions may also use static 
or dynamic simulation techniques, which enable them to assess the impact of hypothetical 
changes in interest rates on net interest income and on the value of the institution. However, 
although institutions carry out this sensitivity analysis, in most cases the results are not pub-
lished20. Accordingly, it is difficult to make any generalisation based on the public information 
available.
It should be noted that the sensitivity of deposit institutions to a change in interest rates will 
depend not only on the interest risk assumed but also on how the credit risk is affected under 
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19. To facilitate the comparison between institutions, the VaR estimates referred to the total market risk and not only the 
interest rate risk of portfolios. This generally reinforces still further the conclusions regarding the low level of interest risk 
in the trading books of Spanish deposit institutions. 20. Most institutions publish only their maturity and repricing matrix, 
not the impact on their net interest income or value of a particular change in interest rates.
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the various interest-rate change scenarios. For example, a rise in interest rates not only affects 
the profits of an institution through maturity gaps and duration, but may also affect the financial 
position of its borrowers. The relative importance of these effects will depend not only on the 
specialisation of each institution and the magnitude of the change in rates, but also on the 
level of borrowers’ indebtedness.
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II Profitability
II.1 General situation In the first half of 2004, deposit institutions engaged in their activity against an economic back-
ground marked by the improved outlook in the main economies and higher growth in the 
Latin American countries. That has made for a firming of the growth of Spanish deposit institu-
tions’ results, based on this occasion on the recovery, in absolute terms, of all margins, despite 
the fact that interest rate spreads have continued to narrow and that stock market prices in Q2 
bore negatively on the institutions’ results. The recovery includes something of a negative im-
pact exerted by the conversion to euro - on a lesser scale than in previous half-year periods - 
of the amounts relating to business abroad.
The group net income of deposit institutions1 accelerated by 19.6% (see Table II.1)2, with a rise 
of 7 bp in terms of ATA to 0.91%. This growth in group net income, which far exceeded that 
of the average own funds of the group (9.2%), is what provided for an increase of 1.3 pp in the 
ROE of deposit institutions as a whole to 15.3% (Chart II.1A). As a result, the profitability/pub-
lic debt spread has widened for the second year running to 11pp.
For deposit institutions as a whole (Chart II.1B), the change in ROE over the past year is in 
response3, first, to lower provisions and write-downs, both of bad debts and of goodwill, 
which is reflected in a positive contribution to the ROE of the group net income/NOI ratio. 
Second, the improvements in the efficiency ratio have continued to contribute significantly to 
the increase in profitability. Both factors have been lessened by the adverse impact of the 
productivity of risk-weighted assets due to the fact that the growth of gross income was far 
below the growth of these assets. Finally, the impact of the asset risk profile, of gearing and of 
the quality of equity was minimal.
Net interest income has begun to pick up at deposit institutions following the declines in the 
previous half-year periods. The breakdown of the year-on-year change in this income (Chart 
II.2A) reveals that, as in 2002, the growth of this income4 (6%) was based on the expansion of 
earning financial assets, countered by a greater volume of interest-bearing financial liabilities, and 
on the improvement of the spread on the liabilities side, thanks to the fall in average deposit rates. 
Nonetheless, both effects have been partly countered by the adverse impact of the narrowing of 
the interest rate spread on the asset side, owing to the stiff competition that has exerted down-
ward pressure on rates beyond the decline in the benchmark rate (3-month euribor).
The favourable trend of net interest income also reveals a lesser impact of the year-on-year 
appreciation of the euro against some of the main Latin American currencies compared with 
1. In this and the following chapter of the FSR, foreign bank branches based in other European Union countries are not 
included, as this sub-group is not subject to capital requirements in Spain. The number of institutions analysed in both 
chapters therefore holds constant. In any event, the relative weight of the institutions excluded is very small. 2. The 
profit and loss account for analytical purposes included in this chapter differs to some extent, in certain groupings of 
headings, from the public profit and loss account. 3.  The previous FSR (Box II.1) explained in detail the breakdown of 
the change in the ROE into six elements: group net income divided by net operating income (NOI), 1 minus the efficiency 
ratio (equivalent to net operating income divided by gross income, NOI/GI), the productivity of risk-weighted assets (GI/
RWA), the risk profile of assets (RWA/A), gearing (A/(tier1+tier2) and the quality of own funds ((tier1+tier2)/equity). 4. The 
change in NII, i.e. ∆NII = (eAt × At – iLt × Lt) – (pAt – 1 × At – 1 – iLt – 1 × Lt – 1), where A, L, eA and iL respectively 
denote earning financial assets, interest-bearing financial liabilities, the average return on earning financial assets and the 
average cost of interest-bearing financial liabilities, can be expressed as the sum of five effects: 1) the volume effect of 
assets; eAt – 1 × (At – At – 1); 2) the volume effect of liabilities, – iLt – 1 × (Lt – Lt – 1); 3) the asset differential effect, 
[(eAt – ret) – ( eAt – 1 – ret – 1)] × At; the liabilities differential effect, [(ret – iLt) – ( ret – 1 – iLt – 1)] × Lt; and 5) the euribor 
effect, (ret – ret – 1) × (At – Lt); where re denotes the 3-month euribor.
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previous periods. This is seen in the growth of net interest income in business abroad (5%) for 
the first time in recent years, which has been driven by the improvement in the total spread (16 
bp).
Commission income grew once again following the declines in absolute terms in the past two 
years (Chart II.2B). This is the outcome, first, of the strong expansion of commissions associ-
ated with the sale of non-bank financial products, linked to the recovery in the net asset value 
of managed mutual funds and, to a lesser extent, to the greater distribution of insurance; and 
second, of the pick-up in commissions for collection and payment services (6.3%), following 
the decline in 2003. Also a positive influence, though of less relevance, was the turnaround in 
commissions associated with securities services (1.7%) and the growth of commissions as-
sociated with contingent liabilities (11.1%), in line with their behaviour in recent years.
The result on financial transactions fell in absolute terms (17.8%), which meant a decline of 4 
bp in terms of ATA. This essentially reflects the marked decline in profits on the trading book 
(10 bp), which is connected with the slackness of stock market prices in Q2 (Chart II.2C) and 
with interest rate movements. The behaviour of trading book results is in contrast to that in 
2003, which largely justified the strong expansion of the result on financial transactions as at 
that date. The deterioration in the results for this book was largely offset by the lower losses 
on other futures transactions and higher income from exchange differences. Finally, profits on 
the available-for-sale fixed-income portfolio held relatively stable.
The declining trend of gross income turned around in the past two quarters (5.8%), although 
it grew at a lower rate than that of ATA, whereby it continued to decline in relative terms (13 bp 
to 3.4%).
TABLE II.1CONSOLIDATED PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT
SOURCE: Banco de España.
JUN-03 JUN-04
% ATA % CH.J.03-J.02 € m % ATA
% CH.
J.03-J.02
Financial revenue 4.69 –14.8 32,040 4.17 –2.4
Financial costs 2.26 –20.7 13,958 1.81 –11.6
Net interest income 2.44 –8.4 18,082 2.35 6.0
Net commissions 0.93 –4.1 7,126 0.93 9.7
Result on financial transactions 0.17 63.3 972 0.13 –17.8
Gross income 3.53 –5.3 26,179 3.40 5.8
Operating expenses 2.04 –6.7 14,680 1.91 2.9
Net operating income 1.50 –3.3 11,499 1.49 9.8
Provisions and write-downs (net) 0.49 –19.8 3,157 0.41 –8.0
Profits from group transactions 0.05 –66.5 618 0.08 82.6
Extraordinary income 0.18 139.7 1,004 0.13 –19.3
Profit before tax 1.23 6.8 9,964 1.30 15.5
Net income 0.96 6.3 7,712 1.00 14.9
MEMORANDUM ITEM
Group net income 0.83 9.4 6,963 0.91 19.6
ATA 100 1.5 1,538,369 100 9.9
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Operating expenses grew by 2.9%, owing to the increases in personnel expenses (2.8%) and 
in overheads and taxes (4.9%), far below the growth in activity, which provided for a fresh re-
duction in terms of ATA (13 bp). Depreciation, by contrast, continued to fall (3%). This moder-
ate growth in deposit institutions’ expenses, compared with that of gross income, made for an 
improvement in the efficiency ratio (Chart II.2D) of 1.6 pp (56.1%). Net operating income grew 
by 9.8%, a similar rate to that of activity, meaning this margin held virtually stable in terms of 
ATA.
Provisions and write-downs bore favourably on the profit and loss account of deposit institu-
tions since they continued to fall in absolute terms (8%). As a result, the proportion of net op-
erating income absorbed by this caption stood at 27%, 6 pp less than in 2001. Specifically, the 
fall in write-downs is attributable to the lower provisions for country risk. Bad-debt provision-
ing, which subtracted one-quarter from net operating income in June 2004, grew by 5.4%, 
despite the lesser need for provisioning of the specific fund, associated with the decline in 
doubtful assets, and as a result of the increase in provisioning to the general and statistical 
funds. Finally, net provisions to other specific funds were twice those in 2003.
Net income on group transactions was appreciably higher than a year earlier, thanks largely to 
the sizable reduction in provisions for the amortisation of goodwill, following the significant ef-
fort made in prior years by certain large institutions to accelerate its amortisation. Further, the 
improved results of non-financial corporations in which deposit institutions have a stake trans-
lated into higher income. Conversely, the weight of profits arising on the sale of shares in fully 
or proportionally consolidated entities was scant; after surging in 2003, such profits stood at 
a similar level to that of the previous year.
Extraordinary income was lower than in the same period of 2003, although its amount re-
mained twice that in 2002. It fell by 5 bp in terms of ATA to 0.13%, owing essentially to the 
lower income from sales of property and of participations in the available-for-sale fixed-income 
portfolio.
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In sum, Spanish deposit institutions’ results continued to grow at a high rate, entrenching the 
recovery mentioned in the previous editions of the FSR. On this occasion, growth was under-
pinned by the sound performance of the more recurrent results, as apparent in the increases 
in the main margins, despite the fact that interest rate spreads have continued to narrow. 
Moreover, the process of containment of operating expenses and of increasing efficiency has 
continued.
II.2 Analysis based on 
individual institutions
The distribution of ATA by ROE improved appreciably, except in the lowest percentiles (Chart 
II.3). Conversely, the distribution of the number of institutions shifted slightly to the left in rela-
tion to June 2003, indicating the fall in the ROE at some entities, whose profitability stands at 
intermediate levels. Overall, the foregoing shows that the ROE tended to improve, although it 
held stable at institutions with relative low ROE levels. Moreover, the improvements were most 
significant at the biggest institutions, while the decline in ROE affected certain small entities.
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Distinguishing between banks and savings banks, there are evidently certain differences in the 
level and, above all, in the determinants of the ROE of these two groups of institutions (Charts 
II.4A, B and C). Banks have a higher ROE, particularly in the latest half-year period, compared 
with the greater stability over time of savings banks’ ROE.
At banks, the breakdown of the year-on-year change in ROE shows that the increase in profit-
ability is largely attributable to the increase in the group net income/net operating income ratio, 
the result in turn of the reduction in provisions for amortising goodwill and for country risk and, 
to a lesser extent, of the improvement in the efficiency ratio (Chart II.4B). The asset risk profile 
and the quality of own funds also improved, although they bore negatively and on a limited 
scale on profitability.
At savings banks, however, the same type of breakdown indicates that the low growth of gross 
income, translated into lower productivity of risk-weighted assets, cancelled out the improve-
ments in profitability induced, first, by the increases in group net income and in the efficiency 
ratio, and second, by the growth of the asset risk profile and the slight deterioration in the qual-
ity of own funds (Chart II.4C).
The distribution of ATA according to the efficiency ratio improved in relation to the first half of 
2003. The shift towards lower brackets of the efficiency ratio centred on relatively big institu-
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tions, while at certain small entities the efficiency ratio worsened, whereby the distribution of 
the number of institutions deteriorated slightly (Chart II.5A, B and C).
The last two FSRs specifically analysed the business, profitability and solvency of credit co-
operatives and of foreign banks’ branches in Spain, respectively. This present edition will study 
specialised credit institutions (Box II.1).
COMPARISON WITH EUROPEAN 
BANKS
The economic and financial circumstances in which European banks operated in 2003 were 
somewhat more favourable than in 2002, but were not exempt from difficulties. In particular, 
EU GDP growth remained below 1%, although the average growth rate during 2004 has im-
proved, fundamentally in some of the countries facing the biggest difficulties in recent years. In 
keeping with these prospects of recovery, the deterioration in financial position that had been 
affecting numerous corporations has recently abated. The stock market performance was duly 
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better than in previous years (the DJ Stoxx 50 index posted growth of around 10% during 
2003, set against the 35% decline recorded the previous year).
Against this backdrop, the conditions for institutions whose main activities are investment 
banking and asset management improved slightly on 2002, but it is retail activity which is most 
contributing to bolstering profitability. Likewise, non-strategic asset disposals and cost ration-
alisation, on which institutions facing most difficulties embarked in previous years, are being 
reflected in their results.
Spanish deposit institutions’ results in 2003, compared with the European average, place 
them, as in previous years, in a relatively favourable light. In particular, both their ROA and 
ROE5 were almost double the EU average. The type of operations engaged in by Spanish in-
stitutions, focusing more on the strongly growing domestic retail segment, and combined with 
activity in Latin America where, in general, margins are higher, explain why net interest income 
as a proportion of total assets6 is around 50% higher than the European average.
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80-90 1.0 10
70-80 3.5 27
60-70 25.0 62
50-60 59.6 42
40-50 6.5 13
<40 3.8 6
C. DISTRIBUTION OF THE EFFICIENCY RATIO
5. ROE is defined as profit after tax as a proportion of tier 1 capital. This definition differs substantially from that used 
throughout the FSR. However, it allows a uniform comparison across the 15 EU countries. 6. Note that assets are not 
averaged out, i.e. they are not ATA. There are, moreover, certain differences in the definitions of margins. Once again, the 
advantage is that what are involved are uniform cross-country data.
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SPECIALISED CREDIT INSTITUTIONS BOX II.1
Specialised credit institutions (SCIs) are entities authorised to engage 
in the full range of activities pursued previously by their predecessors 
(bank-like institutions known as ECAOLs in Spanish), namely: leas-
ing, mortgage lending, financing of capital goods and other buildings, 
and factoring, with an extension to specific activities complementary 
to leasing and to the issuance and management of credit cards. They 
are financed by own funds, by liabilities with credit institutions and by 
the issuance of securities maturing at over one year, it being prohib-
ited to them to raise deposits from the general public. As a result, 
they do not belong to the Deposit Guarantee Funds.
SCIs in 2003 totalled 78, after an ongoing slide from 114 in 1996 
which, in turn, was 57 fewer institutions than the total number of 
bank-like institutions (ECAOLs) operating in 1995. The most sizable 
group among the SCIs are the subsidiaries of credit institutions (42, 
13 of which foreign institutions), with a share in total SCI assets of 
69% (17% of which relating to foreign institutions). The next biggest 
group are the subsidiaries of car firms (11), whose share is 18%. Of 
the 25 remaining institutions, which include the subsidiaries of the 
major distribution corporations, 6 are foreign, and they account for 
13% of the total assets of SCIs (Chart 1).
SCIs’ activity basically involves raising funds on the interbank market 
and extending credit to the resident private sector. Their market share 
in relation to the total number of credit institutions in this sector is 
small (4.3%, 0.4 pp less than in 1996). However, the shares are much 
higher for certain types of credit (Chart 2), as is the case for factoring 
(64%), leasing (34%) or credit card loans (9%).
However, mortgage credit and consumer finance, despite their scant 
weight in the aggregate, are significant segments of the activity pur-
sued by foreign SCIs. For the subsidiaries of foreign credit institu-
tions, mortgage lending accounts for more than half of their lending, 
and two-thirds of the overall mortgage lending extended by SCIs. At 
the institutions that are subsidiaries of car manufacturers, consumer 
finance exceeds 70% of their total credit, which in turn accounts for 
45% of the consumer finance for all SCIs.
This operational specialisation is, in fact, one of the main defining 
characteristics of SCIs’ activity: 37% of these institutions concentrate 
more than 90% of all their credit to the resident private sector in a 
single activity (factoring, mortgage lending, leasing, consumer fi-
nance or credit cards), and 87% concentrate over 50%. Moreover, a 
high percentage of the institutions do not engage in activities such as 
factoring (73%), credit card management (87%), mortgage lending 
(65%) or leasing (63%). The result is a high level of concentration and 
specialisation in each of the different business segments of these in-
stitutions.
The credit extended by SCIs is distributed virtually equally between 
that to non-financial corporations and that to households. Yet while 
credit to non-financial corporations is distributed very uniformly 
among the different productive activities, almost two-thirds of the 
credit extended to households is concentrated in credit for the pur-
chase of consumer goods. The weight of this activity of SCIs in rela-
tion to credit institutions as a whole is 21.7%, with a gain in share 
over the past seven years of somewhat over 3 pp. The weight of the 
remaining uses of credit in the system is considerably less, and has 
even diminished over the period in question, with the exception of 
that extended to mining and industry (Chart 3).
On the liabilities side, and in view of the restrictions on these institu-
tions regarding the raising of deposits and the issuance of debt secu-
rities, the main source of financing is other credit institutions, and in 
the case of subsidiaries, it is their own parents.
Only at the subsidiaries of car manufacturers are liabilities with the 
resident private sector of some relevance, due to the fact that this 
caption includes the financing of the parent, which is not a credit in-
stitution.
The profit and loss account of SCIs, in terms of ATA, is marked by 
high financial revenue and costs, which give rise to a high net interest 
income margin (3.1% of ATA); scant revenue on commissions and on 
financial transactions (0.1%); operating expenses relatively lower than 
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In recent years, Spanish institutions have striven to increase the levels of efficiency at which 
they operate, mindful of the importance of this in an increasingly competitive environment. 
Their efforts have meant that operating expenses in proportion to total assets are in line with 
the European average (5% greater, in contrast to 2002 when they were around 40% higher). 
The higher income obtained, apparent in gross income that is almost 20% greater, combined 
with operating expenses that are only slightly higher than the European average, have given 
rise to net operating income that is somewhat over 40% higher and an efficiency ratio that is 
also more favourable for Spanish institutions.
SPECIALISED CREDIT INSTITUTIONS (cont’d) BOX II.1
those of other credit institutions (1.6%); and a net operating income 
margin and profit before tax (1.6% and 1.2%, respectively) somewhat 
higher, on average, than that obtained by deposit institutions (Charts 
4 and 5).
Nonetheless, the profit and loss account evidences substantial differ-
ences when we group institutions on the basis of their operational 
specialisation. Entities specialising in credit cards and, to a lesser ex-
tent, those dedicated to consumer finance and mortgage lending show 
higher margins than deposit institutions. Prominent here are those 
specialising in credit cards, the only ones where commissions income 
is of some significance. Conversely, institutions specialising in leasing or 
in factoring show lower returns, lower even than those of deposit insti-
tutions. In turn, the greater profitability is associated with a higher level 
of risk, which is manifest in higher default and loan write-downs.
Tracking the changes in the profit and loss account, the increase in 
margins over the past two years has been significant, with the posi-
tive differences vis-à-vis other credit institutions widening. This in-
crease is very widespread across the different segments of speciali-
sation, the basis for all such increases being the improvement in the 
net interest income margin, underpinned by the rise in the average 
return on assets.
Finally, the solvency ratio of SCIs currently stands at 12.2%, comfort-
ably above the minimum level required. The ratio, which was on a 
declining trend until 2000, has increased slightly in the past two years. 
It is on an equal footing with the solvency ratio of the group of de-
posit institutions with a similar volume of business to that of the SCIs, 
whose ratio has traditionally been higher than that of the SCIs.
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Finally, although the comparison in terms of default ratios is also favourable to Spanish institu-
tions, enormous caution is required here since the definition of doubtful assets varies from 
country to country. For example, in some European countries doubtful assets remain on the 
bank balance sheet until their definitive recovery or cancellation, even though they are fully 
provided for. It was earlier discussed in Chapter I that this is not the case in Spain where, once 
three or six years have elapsed, they are removed and recorded as recoveries of written-off 
assets.
If the foregoing analysis is confined to the major European credit institutions7, the conclusions 
about the relative situation of Spanish institutions are analogous. In particular, the net operat-
ing income margin is greater for the major Spanish institutions which, at the same time, oper-
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ate with better levels of efficiency than the big European banks on average. This is due to their 
higher income, seen to a greater extent in the net interest income margin than in the gross 
income margin, and to somewhat higher-than-average operating expenses (approximately 
15%). This better relative position in terms of profitability is reflected both in the ROA and in the 
ROE (132% higher). As was the case for credit institutions as a whole, the foregoing was rein-
forced by a lower default ratio level and greater provisioning for bad debts.
In sum, throughout 2003, and as stated in the previous FSR, there was a relative improvement 
in the financial position of European credit institutions. In this setting, Spanish institutions per-
formed relatively better than the average for the EU, as was also the case in 2002.
As regards 2004, market data indicate that the stock market performance of the main Euro-
pean banks was relatively stable, as was their implied volatility. The major Spanish banks fol-
lowed a similar path.
The spreads for credit default swaps (CDS) also indicate that the perception of participants in 
the market for these products about the degree of risk of European and Spanish institutions is 
that it is stable and relatively low. A further indication confirming this perception is that the 
spread between subordinated and senior debt has held stable and at a low level throughout 
2004.
Finally, there were no significant changes in the betas of the major Spanish banks in relation to 
the last FSR. They held at an intermediate position, similar to that recorded in recent years.
ELECTRONIC BANKING Spain has seen in recent years the emergence of newly created institutions and the setting up 
of foreign institutions (branches of European banks) offering banking products and services 
mainly, though not exclusively, via telephone and, especially, the Internet (what the specialists 
call electronic banking). Established institutions, which mainly use branch offices as their sales 
outlet, have reacted by offering their customers the possibility of operating through these al-
ternative channels as well.
Some of these electronic banking specialists have already abandoned the Spanish market or 
curtailed their expansion plans. Conversely, others, after several years of losses, are now 
showing positive, though still very low, pre-tax income (Chart II.6A). Such income is essen-
tially based on the reduction of the average cost of transactions due to the strong growth of 
activity, since the margins obtained on business are generally small, as is to be expected at 
institutions that attract customers largely on the basis of paying of a return very close to that 
of interbank market rates. As to the structure of costs, this differs substantially from that of 
deposit institutions as a whole (Chart II.6B and C), owing to the different type of business in-
volved and the mass entry by certain institutions on the Spanish market. Finally, the market 
share of institutions specialising in electronic banking in relation to deposit institutions as a 
whole is still small (Chart II.6.D).
Around 90% of the funds raised through this channel in June 2004 were centred solely on the 
five leading institutions, while the share of the rest is very small8. As might be expected, this 
fund-raising channel is the main, if not exclusive, means for institutions specialising in this busi-
ness segment and, conversely, it contributes only marginally to the raising of funds at the 
other multi-channel institutions or those whose main channel is the traditional branch office.
8. Information available as from early 2003.
Texto_Cap II_ingles.indd   11 9/12/04, 9:50:21
Texto_Cap II_ingles.indd   12 9/12/04, 9:50:22
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 57 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2004
III Solvency
III.1 General situation The solvency ratio of Spanish deposit institutions was 10.3% in June 2004, 20 bp below the 
June 2003 level and the same as that in June 2002. Under the BCBS definition, it has been on 
a slightly declining trend that has led to a 1 pp reduction in six years to 12.2% (Chart III.1A).
The tier 1 ratio remains amply above the 4% minimum required, although it continued to de-
cline, standing at 7.8% (Chart III.1A).
This behaviour is in response to capital having continued to grow moderately (8.8%), driven by 
the increase in tier 1 capital and, largely, by the strong rise in tier 2 capital, which is growing at 
a rate of 17.3%, compared with 6.6% in June 2003 (Chart III.1B). Capital requirements1, in line 
with the acceleration in credit, continued to increase (10.8%), at a rate of 3 pp per annum 
(Chart III.2A).
The overall behaviour of tier 1 capital (which accounts for 75.8% of the total) was predomi-
nantly influenced by the strong weight of reserves. The consequence of the pick-up in institu-
tions’ profits was a 6.1% increase in reserves. At the same time, reserves at consolidated in-
stitutions increased significantly (15.5%), this being partly offset by the rise in losses at 
consolidated companies, following the slowdown in June 2003. Nonetheless, outstanding 
preference shares (which account for 18.4% of reserves) did not undergo any significant 
change, though there were differences across groups of institutions. Intangible assets contrib-
uted negatively to tier 1 capital as a result of the increase in goodwill (7%), largely attributable 
to the rise in the stake in a Latin American deposit institution (Chart III.1C).
After a year in which it had been virtually flat, outstanding subordinated financing grew sub-
stantially (18.4%), prompting tier 2 capital to accelerate once more (Chart III.1D). The joint 
weight of preference shares and subordinated financing in total capital increased slightly to 
41%.
As discussed in the previous edition of the FSR, risk-weighted assets (RWA) continued to 
quicken as from June 2002 (Chart III.2A). In terms of requirements, this trend is attributable 
virtually in its entirety to the growth of current credit risk (11.1%) and derived practically in full 
from the growth of balance-sheet assets (12.4%), the main cause for this lying in the increase 
in credit extended in business in Spain (16.7%).
The behaviour of unsecured lending to the private sector, accounting for 49.6% of institutions’ 
credit portfolio, was notable as it increased by 11% (almost 3 pp up on June 2003 and 7 pp 
up on June 2002). Since it is weighted at 100%, its contribution to the capital requirements is 
the most salient of that of all assets (Chart III.2C). Mortgage-backed risks (with a weighting of 
50%) are ranked second in importance in the portfolio (20.9%), closely followed by credits vis-
à-vis general government (18.7%), which do not consume capital. Mortgage-backed assets 
accelerated, growing by 21.1% compared with 13.2% the previous period (Chart III.2B).
Requirements associated with the trading book grew at a rate of 27.9%, but their limited rela-
tive weight means that their contribution is very small (Chart III.2A).
1. Calculated as 8% of risk-weighted assets.
Texto_Cap III_ingles.indd   1 9/12/04, 9:51:05
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 58 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2004
III.2 Analysis based on 
individual institutions
The solvency ratio (Spanish rules) for commercial banks has not changed significantly, al-
though over the past year it has fallen by 13 bp to 9.7%. The ratio per Basel rules behaved 
similarly, remaining virtually unchanged at 12%. The tier 1 ratio, by contrast, dipped by 0.3 pp. 
A declining trend for all the ratios for savings banks, which were down 0.3 pp, was confirmed. 
Under Spanish rules the solvency ratio was 11% in June 2004, and 12.6% under Basel rules. 
This behaviour is more marked in the tier 1 ratio, since it has fallen by somewhat over 1 pp in 
four years (Chart III.3A).
The growth of capital at commercial banks slowed by 1.9 pp to 5.8% (Chart III.3B). The in-
tense momentum of tier 2 capital (which grew by 19.2% compared with 1.3% in June 2003) 
was in contrast to the slowdown in tier 1 capital (2.9%) and to the increase in deductions due 
to the excess of shares in non-consolidated financial institutions (85.1%). The trend of tier 1 
capital is the result of two opposing factors. On one hand, the improvement in results means 
that reserves have increased significantly (Chart III.3C). On the other, intangible assets grew by 
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8.9%, after falling in June 2003, owing to the increase in goodwill resulting from operations in 
Latin America. The growth of tier 2 capital was due to the new issuance of subordinated debt, 
following the redemptions prior to June 2003 (Charts III.3D and III.4B).
Conversely, savings banks saw their capital increase by 12.2% (Chart III.3B), driven by the accel-
eration in both tier 1 and tier 2 capital (11.1% and 15.4%, respectively). Reserves boosted tier 1 
capital, in line with the increase in outstanding preference shares (4.5%), the growth rate of which 
has been falling gradually since June 2001 (Chart III.4A). The resort to subordinated debt by sav-
ings banks continued to become more significant, with growth of 17.4% (Chart III.3D). Tier 2 capi-
tal thus now accounts for 27.1% of total capital (somewhat over 5 pp more than 4 years ago).
Commercial banks’ requirements grew by 7.2%, driven by the increase in credit in Spain-based 
business. And adding to this for the first time in two years was growth in business abroad.
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Balance-sheet assets and, in particular, mortgage assets (23.2%, compared with 7.3% in 
June 2003) and unsecured assets extended to the private sector (8.9%, against 3%) all rose. 
At savings banks, requirements continue to increase at a high rate (15.1%), and there are no 
appreciable changes in relation to the policy pursued in June 2003 (Chart III.4C).
Since June 2003, three new institutions have commenced issuing preference shares, bringing 
the total to 24, comprising 18 savings banks and 6 commercial banks (Chart III.4.D). The over-
all trend of this instrument masks considerably differing behaviour from institution to institution. 
The strong negative contribution of one institution was offset by the positive contributions of a 
small number of others, while the majority showed no notable changes. The increase in tier 1 
capital has meant that the weight of preference shares in tier 1 capital is now less.
The number of large exposures (those whose amount exceeds 10% of the group’s capital) 
increased by 5.2% after falling off in June 2003. Developments in this regard were similar at 
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both commercial and savings banks. However, at commercial banks the increase was due to 
the rise in exposures subject to reporting (52.5%), since those subject to the overall limit (eight 
times the capital of the group) fell by 16.7%, whereas at savings banks the increase was due 
to the rise in the latter group of exposures.
The distribution of the solvency ratio across institutions is in line with the reduction in the over-
all solvency ratio. In relation to June 2003, 67.8% of institutions reduced their solvency ratio, 
which in terms of average total assets (ATA) gives a figure of 57.1%. The result of this reduction 
has been a shift in the distribution of institutions towards lower solvency brackets, concentrat-
ing at around 9% (Table III.1). Also, in terms of ATA, the tier 1 ratio of almost two-thirds of in-
stitutions has declined, meaning that 71.3% of such institutions showed a lower level tier 1 
capital ratio in June 20042.
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2. Of the two institutions (both of which are very small) failing to comply with the solvency ratio (Table III.1), one is being 
wound up while at the other the degree of non-compliance with the 8% minimum is around 30 bp.
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STATISTICAL PROVISION The cyclical position of the Spanish economy remained favourable in the first half of 2004, 
which made for a reduction in non-performing loans and in specific provisioning for bad debts. 
As a result, the overall statistical fund continued to increase, rising to €8 billion in June 2004, 
equal to 0.78% of lending. The amount accumulated in the fund now stands at 71.5% of its 
limit. A growing number of institutions, with an increasingly greater relative weight in terms of 
assets, are now at their limit or very close to it (Chart III.5A).
The notable effort made by institutions since July 2000 to build up the statistical fund, the an-
nual provisions to which have accounted for more than 10% of net interest income on average, 
has led to a most significant increase in the ratio of provisions for bad debts to lending, which 
has virtually doubled (Chart III.5B).
COMPARISON WITH EUROPEAN 
BANKS
As indicated on comparing the profitability of Spanish institutions and their European counter-
parts, the economic circumstances in which European banks operated in 2003 were some-
what more favourable than in 2002, but not free from difficulties. Notwithstanding, the sol-
vency levels for European institutions as a whole were considerably above the regulatory 
minimum.
As regards Spanish institutions, the strong growth of credit extended (essentially to the private 
sector) prompted a greater increase in requirements than that observed in capital. Accord-
ingly, the total and tier 1 capital solvency ratios stood slightly below the European average. The 
type of operations engaged in by Spanish institutions accounts for the relative weight of risk-
weighted assets in total assets being 40% greater in Spain.
However, the soundness of Spanish institutions is not only underpinned, as seen in the forego-
ing section, by the total and tier 1 capital solvency ratios, which are clearly above the regula-
tory minimum; another factor, adding to the strength, compared with the EU average, of their 
profit and loss account, is their greater coverage of doubtful loans. The reason lies in the ef-
fects of the statistical fund, the increase in the general provision, due to the growth of credit 
extended, and the at present relatively low, and declining, level of doubtful loans. Comparison 
of the major Spanish institutions with their European counterparts in respect of solvency is, 
both in quantitative and qualitative terms, very similar to that of deposit institutions taken as a 
whole.
TABLE III.1DISTRIBUTION OF THE SOLVENCY RATIO BY BRACKET
Deposit institutions
SOURCE: Banco de España.
SOLVENCY RATIO
BRACKETS
JUNE-04 JUNE-03
%
ATA
NUMBER OF
INSTITUTIONS
%
ATA
NUMBER OF
INSTITUTIONS
<8 0.0 2 0.0 1
8-10 67.2 47 38.5 38
10-12 24.6 55 43.6 53
12-15 5.8 21 16.2 33
15-20 2.2 25 1.4 20
20-25 0.0 4 0.1 9
>25 0.2 17 0.3 18
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The new capital framework defined by the BCBS (known as Basel II) sets great store by the 
transparency of institutions (Pillar 3). Box III.1 compares the degree of transparency of Spanish 
institutions and that of other developed countries’ banks.
RISKS OF FOREIGN FINANCIAL 
ASSETS
Spanish banks, and the two biggest banking groups in particular, spearheaded a substantial 
expansion abroad from the mid-nineties. Spanish institutions’ presence abroad differs greatly 
depending on the country (Chart III.6A). The characteristics of each country and how banking 
business is conducted and risk managed affect the losses due to credit risk that institutions 
will incur in each national market. Exposure or overall assets in a country is not sufficiently in-
formative about the risk assumed by institutions, since very different probabilities of default 
(PDs) may correspond to a single exposure.
Drawing on information on the composition of assets abroad (sovereign debt, interbank loans 
and lending to other sectors, with certain hypotheses about the structure of the credit portfolio 
with the private sector) and on the PDs for different credit ratings, and extrapolating, using the 
Spanish experience over the past 20 years, information about PDs on the basis of each coun-
try’s bad debts ratio, it is possible to obtain an approximation to the PD of financial assets in 
each country3.
The product of the average PD of each country and Spanish institutions’ assets in that country 
(which we call risk exposure) is a more informative measure of the risk incurred by institutions 
in their business abroad than simply exposure. This new measure translates into a change in 
the ranking of countries (Chart III.6B), with the Latin American countries now appearing as 
those which concentrate most credit risk4.
Note that risk exposure thus calculated is the upper limit of the expected loss, since possible 
recoveries in the event of default are not taken into account; consequently, the actual loss may 
be far off that value. Further, it should be borne in mind that a sizable portion of these expo-
CHART III.5STATISTICAL FUND
SOURCE: Banco de España.
0
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1.5
2
2.5
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
TOTAL
SPECIFIC + GENERAL
PROVISIONS FOR BAD DEBTS AS A PERCENTAGE
OF CREDIT RISK
Commercial and savings banks. ID
%
JUNE  2003 JUNE  2004
No. % ATA No. % ATA
Institutions without a statistical fund 46 5.3 43 7.2
Institutions with percentage of limit covered:
< 10% 9 0.9 5 0.2
10%-25% 9 1.1 11 2.5
25%-50% 32 25.2 18 7.0
50%-75% 53 50.3 35 44.2
75%-90% 29 7.2 27 16.2
90%-100% 23 4.8 26 8.2
100% 70 5.3 100 14
A. DISTRIBUTION OF DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS IN 
TERMS OF THE STATISTICAL FUND SET UP AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF LIMIT
3. A more detailed analysis is available in the paper published in issue no. 7 of Estabilidad Financiera “Activos financieros 
en el exterior e indicadores de riesgo” by R. Lago and J. Saurina. 4. The substantial reduction in risk exposure in 
Mexico is due to the sizable weight of public debt in local currency, to which a very low PD is assigned in keeping with 
the rating accorded to such debt. In Portugal, by contrast, most exposure is with the resident private sector, which has 
a greater PD.
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sures is maintained via subsidiaries operating in the country in question. The risk exposure/
capital ratio of the institution is a maximum limit for the impact of the credit risk of foreign as-
sets on institutions’ solvency. It can be seen (Chart III.6C) that, country by country, and for the 
countries as a whole, this maximum limit is low (3.5% without Argentina, and 8.6% if we in-
clude it)5, and significantly lower than the excess of capital over the regulatory minimum.
Some bank analysts have designed measures seeking to approximate the risk profile (or risk 
exposure) of the foreign assets of a country’s deposit institutions. The problem is that no dis-
tinction is made in these approaches between the different elements making up such assets, 
and the PD of the sovereign debt of the country where the banking assets are is applied as the 
measure of risk. The foregoing normally makes for a very downward-biased measure of the 
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
MXUK PT DE NLUS IT FR CLBRBE AR VE COPE UYBO
A. SPANISH DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS' FOREIGN
FINANCIAL ASSETS
June 2004
€ m
CHART III.6FOREIGN FINANCIAL ASSETS AND RISK
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a. Risk exposure is calculated as foreign assets multiplied by the country’s average PD. For 
Argentina, the amount of risk exposure is €5,766 million.
b. For Argentina the ratio is 5.1%.
c. Argentina is not included in the calculations.
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5. Naturally, the impact on each individual institution will vary depending on the distribution of its assets abroad and on 
its level of capital.
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TÍTULO BOX BOX ??
The transparency of deposit institutions to their investors (sharehold-
ers, buyers of preference shares, subordinated debt and other secu-
rities issued by the institutions, and depositors) is a key factor in en-
suring the appropriate management of banks via the disciplining 
effect of the financial markets.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision decided in 1999 to 
initiate an annual survey (Public Disclosure Survey by Banks) on the 
degree of transparency of the most significant internationally active 
banks1. This survey seeks to evaluate the degree of compliance with 
the recommendations on transparency made by the BCBS2. The 
Survey contains 104 questions structured in 12 areas (Table 1) on the 
level of disclosure attained in respect of capital, risks (particularly 
credit risk) and derivatives. The Committee seeks hereby to identify 
trends in disclosure practices and to publicise them through the re-
lease of the survey results. The survey analyses the Annual Reports 
of the banks in question, but is completed by the supervisors of each 
country, not the banks. The information is summarised in the form of 
the disclosure rate, defined as the amount of affirmative replies (the 
institution is transparent) in proportion to the sum of affirmative and 
negative replies. Significantly, nonetheless, the nature of the replies 
always has a substantial measure of subjectivity.
The findings of the latest available survey indicate that Spanish institu-
tions have progressed significantly in their overall level of transparency, 
with the total transparency ratio climbing from 46% in 2002 to 57% in 
2003. However, this ratio remains below the average (63% in 2001) for 
the overall set of institutions surveyed. The results across areas and their 
comparison with the average for the institutions as a whole infers that:
a) While the overall transparency ratio is less than that of the Basel 
average for banks, in five areas the transparency of Spanish insti-
tutions is clearly greater. These are: internal and external ratings 
(63% versus 46%), credit risk models (50% versus 33%), asset 
quality (77% versus 61%), other risks (100% versus 84%) and in-
house models for market risk (75% versus 68%).
b) The areas with a greater degree of transparency in both 2003 and 
2002 are those relating to other risks (100%), capital structure 
(77%), asset quality (77%) and in-house models for market risk 
(75%), coinciding in the first two cases with the areas of greatest 
transparency according to the Basel average.
c) The areas of least transparency are securitisation (6%) and credit 
derivatives (17%), the average situation for this latter variable being 
among the worst (34%). Moreover, these two areas are among 
those that have least progressed compared with 2002.
d) The very low level of transparency attained in the area of securiti-
sation (6%) compared with the average (45%) is significant, as is 
geographical and business-line diversification (30% versus 65%) 
and derivatives (33% compared with 62%).
e) A more detailed analysis of the least transparent areas shows that: 
i) Spanish banks do not disclose sufficient qualitative data on ob-
jectives and strategies in either the use of derivatives, particularly 
credit derivatives, or in asset securitisation. ii) In quantitative terms, 
matters are not much better, with insufficient clarity as to the effect 
on results of securitisation, of trading activities by type of risk and 
of derivatives activity distinguishing trading and hedging. In the 
area of securitisation, it is not specified either whether there is any 
type of retained risk, subordinated assets and, where appropriate, 
how it is hedged. Also, the breakdowns are insufficient, or are not 
along BCBS-recommended lines in terms of exposure to credit 
risk (by type of counterpart, business line or sovereign risk) and 
doubtful loans (by sector, type of asset or geographical area). 
Here, transparency is not only poor in absolute terms but also in 
relation to the Basel average (in excess of 50% in many cases).
RANSPARENCY OF SPANISH DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS BOX III.1
1. Somewhat over 50 institutions belonging to the BCBS member countries. 2. These 
recommendations feature in the following BCBS publications: Best Practices for Credit Risk 
Disclosures, September 2000; Recommendations for Public Disclosure of Trading and De-
rivatives Activities of Banks and Securities firms, October 1999; and, naturally, in Pillar 3 of 
the final document of Basel II (International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards. A revised framework, June 2004).
% SPANISH INSTITUTIONS OVERALL BASEL AVERAGE
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999
Capital structure 77 76 82 81 76
Capital adequacy 58 17 55 50 48
In-house models for market risk 75 69 68 66 65
Internal and external ratings 63 50 46 36 32
Credit risk models 50 33 33 34 33
Securitisation 6 0 45 36 29
Asset quality 77 54 61 55 56
Credit derivatives and other credit improvements 17 8 34 24 24
Derivatives (other) 33 22 62 56 57
Geographical and business-line diversification 30 25 65 62 64
Basis of presentation and accounting policies 71 71 84 84 82
Other risks (operational, interest rate and liquidity risk) 100 100 84 75 65
TOTAL DISCLOSURE RATE 57 46 63 59 57
TABLE 1TRANSPARENCY RATIOS
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TRANSPARENCY OF SPANISH DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS (cont’d) BOX III.1
It should be clarified that the above comparisons were with data for 
2003 for Spain and for 2001 for the Basel average. That biases the 
analysis in favour of Spanish banks if, as would be expected and in 
line with the trend of Spanish institutions, the average bank has 
continued improving its transparency in the past two years. This 
distortion may be particularly relevant where the transparency of 
Spanish institutions is higher (modelling of risks) owing to the strong 
impulse the Basel II process has entailed for internationally active 
banks.
Enlarging the sample of institutions to include other large entities but 
with a scant level of international activity, the comparison in terms of 
transparency worsens substantially. Now, the set of Spanish institu-
tions only attains a transparency ratio of 45% in 2003 which, how-
ever, marks significant progress on 2002 (34%). It can be deduced 
from this that, overall, Spanish deposit institutions must continue to 
strive to improve the information they convey to investors so that the 
market may contribute effectively to disciplining these institutions. 
Basel II is going to reinforce this need even further via its third pillar.
risk incurred by institutions in their foreign business. Moreover, the changes in the index may 
not be a good measure either of the change in risk.
One means of avoiding the above-mentioned biases and achieving a better risk profile indica-
tor involves, first, taking asset composition into account; and, further, using different PDs for 
each type of asset. As was done to calculate risk exposure, it is possible to construct an ag-
gregate risk profile indicator calculating only the weighted mean of the average PDs for each 
country (Chart III.6D)6.
The risk profile of foreign assets can be seen to have diminished progressively since 2001 (or 
since 2002 if Argentina is included) and to be at a relatively low level in 20037. It is further seen 
that the exclusive use of the sovereign rating biases the risk profile downwards and distorts 
evaluation of the changes in the risk profile. The PD of credit to the resident private sector is, 
as was to be expected, significantly higher than that of sovereign debt.
6. Once again, a more detailed analysis can be found in the paper referred to in footnote 31. 7. The recent pattern is 
relatively similar if Argentina is included, although the level of the index is , naturally, substantially higher.
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1 Explanatory notes
Consolidated financial statements of groups of deposit institutions resident in Spain. Aggrega-
tion of the balance sheets or profit and loss accounts of groups of deposit institutions resident 
in Spain. In the case of institutions that do not have or belong to a consolidable group or that 
are branches of foreign institutions, their individual accounts are considered for aggregation 
purposes, and in the case of subsidiaries of foreign institutions, it is the sub-consolidated ac-
counts (those of the group that depend on it) that are taken.
The consolidated financial statements (balance sheet or profit and loss account) comprise the 
worldwide total consolidated business, with intra-group transactions netted out, of the groups 
of institutions considered. These groups are made up of the parent institution in Spain (with its 
branches abroad) and its consolidable subsidiaries, both in Spain and abroad.
The consolidable financial subsidiaries in groups of deposit institutions are those in which 
control is exercised (control is assumed when voting rights or a share of at least 20% of capi-
tal are held) and which belong to one of the following: deposit institutions, specialised credit 
institutions, securities-dealers companies and securities agencies, investment companies, 
companies managing collective investment undertakings, companies managing pension 
funds, portfolio management companies, venture capital companies and companies manag-
ing venture capital funds, holders of shares or participations and, finally, institutions, whatever 
their name or statute, that engage in activities typical of the foregoing (e.g. SPEs, SPVs).
The consolidated accounts of groups of deposit institutions resident in Spain may be of na-
tional or foreign institutions; in the latter case they will be subsidiaries or branches of foreign 
institutions.
These statements (total business), as in Fig. 1, can be presented on the basis of the location 
in which the institution’s operational unit resides, giving rise to business in Spain or abroad 
(assets in Spain or assets abroad), or the location in which the counterparty resides, giving rise 
to the sectorisation of business with residents in Spain and with non-residents (or with foreign-
ers). Moreover, if the residence of the operational unit coincides with that of the counterparty, 
the reference will be to local business, and if it does not, to cross-border business, non-local 
business or business abroad.
The consolidation of accounts is based on the control of the group by the parent institution and 
is essential when analysing the capital integrity and financial stability of a banking system.
Individual financial statements of deposit institutions resident in Spain. Aggregation of individ-
ual balance sheets or profit and loss accounts of these institutions.
The individual statements (balance sheet or profit and loss account) comprise the total world-
wide business engaged in by individual deposit institutions resident in Spain. These institutions 
may be national or foreign (subsidiaries and branches of foreign deposit institutions) and are 
made up of a central headquarters and all its branches abroad (if any), but they do not include 
the subsidiaries of Spanish institutions operating abroad.
As in the case of consolidated information, the individual statements (total business) can, as 
observed in Fig. 1, be presented using the location in which the operational unit (central 
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headquarters or branch) resides and the location in which the counterparty resides. However, 
while total business does not include or nets out transactions between units of the institutions 
residing in different countries, business in Spain and business abroad does not see a netting 
out of transactions between the units that reside in these territorial areas: Spain and other 
countries. In other words, business in Spain includes positions vis-à-vis own branches 
abroad because they are non-residents and such information is necessary  to compile the 
National Accounts and Balance of Payments, but in total business such transactions are 
consolidated.
Local business (in the case of Spain, business in Spain with residents), the predominant item 
of the individual accounts of the institutions that reside in a country, are the basis of the na-
tional accounts of said country (Spain) and, therefore, these accounts are linked to the gen-
eral macroeconomic analysis of the country in question and to the way in which its sectors are 
financed. Accordingly, there is usually much more information and a greater breakdown of the 
individual accounts of institutions, as regards their sectorisation, instruments and results, than 
of the consolidated accounts of their groups.
FIGURE 1CLASSIFICATION OF ACCOUNTS AND BUSINESS ON THE BASIS
OF THE LOCATION FROM WHICH THE INSTITUTION OPERATES
AND WITH WHOM IT OPERATES
TOTAL 
BUSINESS
According 
to where 
the 
banking 
operational 
unit 
resides
1 Business in Spain
1.1 With residents = Local business in Spain (when assets 
involved = local assets)
1.2 With non-residents = Cross-border business (when assets 
involved = assets external to the Spanish banking system)
2 Business abroad
2.1 With residents = Cross-border business 
2.2 With non-residents
Local business = when the place 
of residence of the operational 
unit coincides with the residence 
of the customer
Cross-border or non-local 
business = when they do not 
coincide
According 
to where 
the bank 
customer 
resides
3 Residents = 1.1 + 2.1
3.1 Business in Spain = 1.1
3.2 Business abroad = 2.1 
4 Non-residents = 1.2 + 2.2 
4.1 Business in Spain = 1.2
4.2 Business abroad = 2.2
FIGURE 2CLASSIFICATION OF BOTH THE RESIDENT SECTOR
AND THE NON-RESIDENT SECTOR
Central Bank
Credit institutions (CIs) = Deposit institutions (banks, savings banks and credit co-operatives) and specialised credit institutions
General government = Central government (State and administrative and similar agencies), Territorial governments (Regional 
governments in Spain’s case and Local governments with their respective administrative and similar agencies)
Other sectors = Private sector = Other private sectors
Financial corporations other than CIs
Non-financial corporations and sole proprietorships
Households and non-profit institutions 
serving households (NPISH)
Households
NPISH
IEF_nov_2004 ingles_Anejo ingles.indd   4 9/12/04, 9:54:58
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 71 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2004
Institutional sectors. The FSR classifies the institutional sectors featured in Fig. 2 as Residents, 
namely those who have a centre of interest or live in Spain, and Non-residents, those who 
have a centre of interest or live in a country other than Spain, irrespective of whether they re-
side or not in the same country as the deposit institution’s operational unit. Both institutional 
sectors are sub-divided into the following sub-sectors: Central banks, CIs, General govern-
ment and other sectors (households, sole proprietorships and corporations other than CIs).
Productive activities. The Report refers to activities undertaken by sole proprietorships and by 
corporations other than CIs, on the basis of the branches featured in Fig. 3.
The definitions of the balance-sheet and profit and loss account items are to be found in 
Banco de España Circular 4/1991. Nonetheless, the glossary includes certain items in the light 
of their greater complexity and relevance for the analysis of financial stability.
FIGURE 3CLASSIFICATION OF THE SECTOR NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, SOLE 
PROPRIETORSHIPS AND FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN CIs ON 
THE BASIS OF THE TYPE OF PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY IN WHICH THEY ENGAGE
Branches or sectors of activity
Agriculture, livestock breeding, hunting and forestry
Fishing
Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Production and distribution of electricity, gas and water
Construction
Services
Wholesale and retail trade and repairs
Restaurants and hotels
Transport, storage and communications
Financial intermediation except CIs
Insurance
Other financial 
intermediation
Real estate activities
Other business services
Other services
Memorandum item: construction and real estate activities
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2 Glossary
Asset securitisation: Assignment by an institution of its loans or other receivables (present or 
future) to a securitisation SPV which, in turn, issues fixed-income securities to be traded on an 
organised secondary market.
Asset spread: Difference between the average return on earning financial assets and average 
three-month euribor.
Asset-backed bonds: Bonds issued by securitisation special purpose vehicles (see asset se-
curitisation).
Available-for-sale portfolio: Fixed-income securities or equities that have not been assigned to 
another portfolio.
Average total assets: Average of the assets in the period in which such assets give rise to flows 
of income. To obtain the assets of which the average is taken, and solely for the purpose of 
expressing the profit and loss account items in relative terms, the following items are deducted 
from the total assets of the balance sheet: intangible assets, own stakes and shareholders, 
prior years’ losses, prepaid interest on funds raised at a discount and unmatured accrued in-
terest revenues on investments taken at a discount. In addition, in the case of the consoli-
dated balance sheet, the losses at consolidated companies are deducted and, in the individ-
ual balance sheet, as the relevant detailed information is available, the unrealised losses in the 
available-for-sale fixed-income portfolio.
Bancassurance: Strategy involving the joint provision of banking and insurance products, us-
ing the same distribution channel and/or the same customer base.
Basel I: Capital Accord reached by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 1988. This 
established a set of recommendations (converted into requirements in a large number of coun-
tries) regarding capital, risk-weighted assets and an 8% minimum level for the solvency ratio, 
which sought to strengthen the solvency of the international banking system, as well as level-
ling the competitive playing field.
Basel II: Revision of the 1988 Capital Accord (Basel I). The basic aim was to promote a more 
risk-sensitive system of capital requirements, encouraging the use of internal risk measure-
ment methods by the institutions for the purpose, while maintaining the overall level of sol-
vency and ensuring a level playing field.
Basic margin: Net interest income plus net commissions.
Beta: Measure of the systemic risk assumed by an institution. It is based on the CAPM model 
(Capital Asset Pricing Model), which considers the market to be the sole risk factor. The beta 
is calculated as the covariance between the returns on the share and the market, divided by 
the variance of the market return. In the FSR, the market index used is the DJ Stoxx 50, unless 
otherwise stated.
Bid-ask spread: The difference, at a given moment, between the highest bid price and the 
lowest ask price for a security.
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Branch: Offices of the institution situated in a foreign country without independent legal status. 
They form an integral part of the institution, generally do not have separate accounts (except 
for internal purposes) and they may not take economic decisions or contract liabilities or pos-
sess assets in their own name. Branches are subject to the laws and supervision of the home 
country (that of the head office).
Business risk: That associated with the loss of the position an institution has in the market.
Capital requirements: 8% of risk-weighted assets, this being the minimum solvency ratio re-
quired by the supervisor.
Capitalisation: The market value of a company, calculated by multiplying the number of shares 
in issue by their price on the stock market.
Collateralised mortgage bonds: Securities that can only be issued by CIs, which enable these 
institutions to secure the participation, in whole or part, of third parties, in one or more mort-
gages of their portfolio, excluding those used to secure the issuance of mortgage bonds. The 
term of the bond cannot exceed the residual maturity of the mortgage loan nor can it pay a 
higher rate of interest.
Companies valued by the equity method: Mechanism for including those companies that, 
despite having a certain stake, are not included in the consolidated group, either on account 
of their business (insurance and non-financial firms), or because, although they are capable of 
being consolidated, there is no control (holding of less than 20%) although they are associat-
ed. This mechanism consists of valuing the holdings at their underlying book value –net worth– 
plus (less) the balance of the consolidation goodwill (negative consolidation differences) of the 
investee.
Consolidation goodwill: Difference, at the time of purchase, between the acquisition value and 
the underlying book value of the stake in a subsidiary or affiliate. This arises from the valuation 
of intangible assets of value to the purchaser including, among others, the purchased entity’s 
position in the market, customers, reputation and brand image.
Contingent liabilities: Transactions under which an institution guarantees the obligations of a 
third party (guarantees, letters of credit, etc.)
Corporate banking: Banking activity with –typically large– non-financial corporations.
Corporate bond spread: Measure of the perception of corporate credit risk. Difference be-
tween the interest rates on private bonds and risk-free bonds, in the same currency and with 
similar duration. In the FSR, US Treasury bonds are taken to be risk-free (or very low risk).
Cost of debt: See debt service.
Counterparty risk: Possibility of incurring losses in the event that the counterparty defaults on 
its contractual obligations. Unlike credit risk, it is not incurred with the issuer of a financial in-
strument, but with the counterparty of a transaction (normally a derivative) based on a primary 
instrument issued by a third party.
Country risk: That present in the debts of a country considered overall for circumstances 
other than normal commercial risk. It arises from the existence of two different national jurisdic-
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tions and originates from the ineffectiveness of legal actions against a State for reasons of 
sovereignty. It is classified as: (i) sovereign risk, when the debtor is the State itself; (ii) transfer 
risk, which arises from the imposition of restrictions on the conversion of the local currency to 
a strong currency or on its repatriation; and (iii) political risk, which results from legal provisions 
or from situations of war or social instability.
Cover ratio: Ratio between the provisions for bad debts and doubtful assets.
Covered bonds (cédulas hipotecarias): Fixed-income securities that can only be issued by CIs, 
subject to certain restrictions, which are secured by all the mortgage loans in their portfolio, 
excluding those assigned to mortgage bonds and collateralised mortgage bonds.
Credit Default Swaps (CDS): Swap whereby the purchaser acquires (the seller grants) protec-
tion against possible non-payment by a third party. The amount paid for the insurance transac-
tion is considered to be a risk premium, since it provides information on the probability of de-
fault by the third party. (See credit derivatives).
Credit derivative: Contract involving an obligation to pay that depends either on the value of a 
debt instrument (loan or bond), or on the solvency, yield spread or credit rating of one or more 
specified borrowers. This payment obligation is performed either by cash settlement or 
through the delivery of the underlying asset or assets.
Credit institutions (CIs): Firms whose typical activity is to receive deposits or close substitutes 
for deposits from entities other than credit institutions and, for their own account, to grant 
credits, and those, other than the foregoing, who issue means of payment in the form of elec-
tronic money. Deposit institutions, specialised deposit institutions and the ICO are credit insti-
tutions. However, SCIs cannot raise deposits, although they can raise close substitutes for 
deposits from the public.
Credit portfolio: Sum of the outstanding loans granted and the fixed-income portfolio (debt 
instrument counterpart). The FSR uses this term as a synonym for financing extended and also 
total lending. This definition is valid for any specifically cited sector and for the economy as a 
whole.
Credit rating: Assessment of the credit quality of a debtor in accordance with its credit risk. A 
wide range of methods are available to reach this assessment.
Credit risk: Possibility of an institution incurring losses in the event of a debtor defaulting, in 
form and/or time, on its obligations as established in the agreement. It may be presented as 
insolvency risk or country risk.
Customer spread: Difference between the average return on non-interbank lending in euro and 
non-interbank financing received in euro.
Debt burden arising from interest: Ratio between accrued interest and gross disposable in-
come in the period considered.
Debt burden: Ratio between the sum of accrued interest and, if applicable, the principal of the 
debt repaid and gross disposable income in the period considered.
Debt instruments: See debt.
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Debt ratio: Ratio between the debt of a sector and its total assets (financial and real).
Debt service: Interest accrued and, where applicable, principal of the debt repaid during the 
period considered.
Debt: The outstanding balance, at a specific time, of loans received and fixed-income is-
sued.
Deposit institutions: Subgroup of CIs consisting basically of commercial banks, savings banks 
and credit co-operatives. The only ones with the capacity to raise deposits from the public.
Doubtful assets ratio: Ratio between doubtful assets and financing extended.
Doubtful assets: Debit balances that are considered unlikely to be fully repaid on the contrac-
tually agreed terms, either because of default or for other reasons (if the institution has reason-
able doubts regarding their recovery).
Earning financial assets: Financial assets excluding accrual accounts and other assets, i.e. 
those to which it is possible to assign an explicit financial return.
Efficiency ratio: Ratio between operating expenses and gross income; i.e. the percentage of 
gross income absorbed by operating expenses. A higher value of the ratio corresponds to 
lower efficiency.
Exchange rate effect: Reduction (increase) in the value of balance sheet or profit and loss ac-
count items owing to depreciation (appreciation) with respect to the euro of the currencies of 
the countries in which such items are located or generated, without the activity, profitability or 
costs abroad in local currency necessarily having fallen (increased).
Expected losses: Anticipated losses, i.e. those that on average will arise on a portfolio. Calcu-
lated as the average value of the loss distribution, whether or not they have been detected.
Exposure: Amount of balance sheet assets and contingent liabilities that may be subject to risk.
Financial assets: Cash, loans, fixed-income securities, equities, accrual accounts and other 
assets. However, references in the FSR to financial assets generally refer to earning financial 
assets.
Financial conglomerates: Groups of financial institutions that cannot be consolidated owing to 
their nature, i.e. those made up of: 1) credit institutions and their groups and by insurance 
companies and their groups and, 2) those made up of insurance companies and their groups 
and securities-dealer companies and securities agencies.
Financing extended: See credit portfolio.
Foreign exchange risk: Possibility of incurring losses owing to adverse movements in the cur-
rency in which the exposure is denominated.
Foreign-exchange losses or reserves in consolidated companies: These arise as a conse-
quence of the depreciation or appreciation of the currency in which the unhedged holdings in 
the capital of foreign consolidated companies are denominated. In simple terms, they are the 
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difference between converting the net worth of the investee at the current and the historical 
exchange rate. A depreciation (appreciation) of the currency in which the net worth is de-
nominated, with respect to the euro, entails a loss (profit). Having deducted that part corre-
sponding to minority interests, this loss (profit) is recorded as losses (reserves) in consolidated 
companies (both being balance-sheet items included in regulatory capital).
General provision: Provision in the period considered, charged to the profit and loss account, 
to the general bad-debt provision, with the application of certain percentages (generally 1% or 
0.5% for mortgage loans that fulfil certain conditions) to those credit risks without a specific 
provision.
Gross disposable income: Income available to the various sectors for final consumption 
(households and general government) and gross saving.
Gross income: Net interest income plus net commissions and the result on financial transac-
tions.
Gross operating profit of non-financial corporations: Gross value added less staff costs. It may 
be considered roughly equivalent to the gross operating surplus of the National Accounts and, 
with the necessary caveats, to the net operating income of CIs.
Gross value added at market prices (non-financial firm): difference between the value of its 
output and its inputs. Also, sales plus the changes in stocks of finished products less the cost 
of sales (operating expenses other than staff costs) plus the change in stocks of raw materials 
and work in progress.
Held-to-maturity portfolio: Comprises the fixed-income securities the institution has decided 
to hold to redemption.
Historical volatility: Annualised standard deviation of the market prices of the underlying for the 
period analysed. It approximates the market’s perception of risk.
Implied volatility: Using a particular option valuation model, in which all the parameters are 
considered given except the underlying price of the asset in question and its historical volatil-
ity, the implied volatility is obtained, at a given moment, by introducing the market price as the 
underlying price of the asset. It gives an indication of the market’s perception of risk.
Insolvency risk: Possibility in the normal course of business (normal commercial risk), of incur-
ring losses as a consequence of a debtor defaulting on its payment obligations.
Interest rate risk: Possibility of incurring losses on account of changes in interest rates.
Interest-bearing liabilities: Those liabilities (deposits and fixed-income securities) that have an 
explicit financial cost associated with them.
Interest-rate curve: At a given moment, it shows the level of actual rates at different terms for 
a risk-free asset.
Internal ratings based approach (IRB approach): Basel II encourages the institutions them-
selves to determine their own capital requirements, solely (advanced IRB) or partially 
(foundation IRB) using their own methods, according to the risk incurred.
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Investment banking: Banking activity in the primary and secondary securities markets 
(underwriting and placement of issues, securities trading, financial advice to companies, 
etc.)
Kernel estimator: Non-parametric estimation of the density function, which provides a continu-
ous and smoothed graphic representation of such function.
Large exposures: From a regulatory standpoint, large exposures are those vis-à-vis a single 
person or economic group, where the sum of the amount of the credit and trading-book risk 
exceeds 10% of the regulatory capital of the banking group. Since, on account of the high 
degree of exposure to one borrower, such exposures can jeopardise the solvency of an institu-
tion, in the event that the customer concerned is in difficulty, there are individual and overall 
limits to the large exposures that institutions can assume.
Large firms: According to the BCBS, in its proposed new capital accord, a large firm has an-
nual sales of more than €50 million.
Liability spread: Spread between average three-month euribor and the average cost of inter-
est-bearing liabilities.
Liquidity risk: In the FSR this refers to asset liquidity risk, i.e. agents’ inability to dispose of their 
assets without significantly affecting market prices.
Losses incurred: Losses that have actually arisen on an institution’s portfolio.
Market index: Constructed by taking the average of a fixed but adjustable set of firms listed on 
a specific stock market or on various markets. Its movement is a good approximation to the 
movement of the stock market concerned.
Market risk: Possibility of incurring losses owing to changes in the value of positions on or off 
the balance sheet, as a consequence of adverse movements in interest rates, in exchange 
rates and in the market prices of assets. Sometimes interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk 
and price risk are mentioned directly, and other times market risk is called price risk.
Mixed groups: Those that include consolidated groups of credit institutions and of insurance 
companies. In Spain, the Banco de España or the Directorate General of Insurance and Pen-
sion Funds are responsible for their supervision, depending on the importance of their con-
stituent institutions.
Mortgage bonds (bonos hipotecarios): Fixed-income securities that can only be issued by CIs, 
subject to certain restrictions, specially secured by the mortgage loans assigned to them in the 
deed.
National deposit institutions: Savings banks, co-operatives and those commercial banks that 
are majority-owned by Spaniards with head office or parent company in Spain
Net debit/credit balance: Difference between the financing extended (asset) and received (lia-
bility). For CIs, when this difference is positive the net balance is a debit one and when it is 
negative, a credit one.
Net interest income: Financial revenue less financial costs.
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Net operating income: Gross income less operating expenses.
Net wealth: See net worth.
Net worth: Assets less liabilities.
Non-voting equity units: Securities that can be issued, subject to certain restrictions, by sav-
ings banks to strengthen their capital. Their remuneration depends on the profits obtained by 
the institution, subject to certain limits. In the event that the institution is wound up they come 
behind the ordinary creditors, holders of subordinated debt and holders of preference 
shares.
Offshore centres: Territories that grant a preferential tax treatment to companies based in 
them.
Operational risk: Possibility of incurring losses as a consequence of inadequate internal proce-
dures, staff or systems, or as a consequence of external events.
Own funds attributed to the group: Sum of the capital stock, reserves (including reserves at 
consolidated companies), group net income and the provisions for general banking risks, less 
shareholders’ equity and own stakes, and the prior years’ losses at the controlling entity and 
at consolidated companies. The average level, obtained in a similar way to ATAs, is used as 
the denominator in the calculation of ROE.
PER (Price Earnings Ratio): Ratio between the listed price of the shares of a particular com-
pany and the earnings obtained thereby during a specified period (year, business cycle, etc.).
Permanent holdings portfolio: Holdings in subsidiaries and affiliates intended to serve in a last-
ing way the activities of the institution or group to which it belongs.
Preference shares: Securities issued by credit institutions that, in certain circumstances, form 
part of their tier 1 capital. Their remuneration is fixed and periodic, but may be nil if the bank or 
its group suffer losses, in which case, normally, it is not cumulative (i.e. when no remuneration 
is paid one year it cannot be recovered in future). They are normally issued without a redemp-
tion term but the bank may redeem them, with the prior permission of the Banco de España, 
after five years.
Price risk: Possibility of incurring losses owing to adverse movements in asset prices.
Primary securities market: Market on which securities are issued and redeemed.
Provisions: Flow during the period, charged to the profit and loss account, whose purpose is 
to correct the valuation of individual assets, or of specific groups of assets, or to anticipate 
specific payments or contingent charges (specific provisions), or to cover general risks (gen-
eral provisions). The main specific provisions are the bad-debt, country-risk and securities-
price fluctuation provisions.
Real assets: Non-financial assets or tangible fixed assets.
Regulatory capital: That allowed by the regulator for the purposes of calculating the solvency 
ratio. Tier 1 and tier 2 capital are distinguished, on the basis of their ability to absorb losses. 
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Spanish regulations define regulatory capital more strictly than Basel I, especially as regards 
tier 2 capital.
Result on financial transactions: Profits less losses on the trading book and on creditors on 
securities arising from valuation differences, on exchange differences, on non-hedging futures 
transactions and on the available-for-sale fixed-income and equity portfolios, as well as provi-
sions and write-downs in relation to the securities-price fluctuation provisions.
Retail banking: Banking activity with small and medium-sized businesses and households.
Return on assets (ROA): Ratio between net income (after taxes) attributed to the group and 
average total assets.
Return on equity (ROE): Ratio between net income (after taxes) attributed to the group and the 
average own funds attributed to the group.
Risk exposure: Product of the exposed amount and the PD assigned to such amount. The 
effect of loss given default (LGD) is not included.
Risk mitigation: Elements incorporated into a transaction, in the form of security interests, 
guarantees or credit derivatives, that help to reduce its associated risk.
Risk premium: The return required from a security in excess of that on a safe asset to compen-
sate for the higher risk of the former relative to the latter.
Risk profile of assets: Assets weighted by risk with respect to total assets.
Risk profile of the credit portfolio: Calculated on the basis of the standard method for the sta-
tistical provision by multiplying the parameters assigned to each of the six categories of risk by 
the exposure contained therein. The six categories are: Risk-free, which includes, among oth-
ers, exposures to EU general governments or exposures guaranteed by the latter; Low-risk, 
which includes loans secured by mortgages on completed housing when the outstanding risk 
is less than 80% of the appraisal value of the housing and transactions in which the borrower 
is an A- or higher rated firm; Medium/low-risk, which includes leasing transactions not in-
cluded in other risk categories and those risks secured by some security interest other than 
those mentioned in the preceding two categories; Medium-risk, which includes risks vis-à-vis 
residents in Spain not included in other risk categories; Medium/high-risk, which includes 
loans to individuals for the purchase of durable goods and current goods and services; High-
risk, which includes credit card balances and the current- and credit-account overdrafts of 
borrowers not included in the risk-free category.
Risk profile or risk exposure (financial assets abroad): The probability of default multiplied by 
the exposure or, where applicable, the assets potentially subject to risk.
Risk-weighted assets: The balance-sheet assets and contingent liabilities of an institution multiplied 
by the relevant weights, according to the instrument and the counterpart sector (Basel I). The weights 
attempt to reflect the credit, foreign exchange and market risk associated with each exposure.
Rollover risk: Possibility of losses arising from the need to resort to the market given the lack 
of coincidence between the maturity of the instrument that provides the financing and the time 
horizon for which it is required.
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Secondary securities market: Market on which securities issued on primary markets are traded.
Senior debt: Debt which, in the event of liquidation, ranks for repayment before other debt.
Solvency coefficient: Percentage ratio between regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets, 
which according to current law (CBE 5/1993) shall be at least 8%.
Sovereign spread: Measure of the market’s perceptions of the probability of non-payment of 
the government debt of a particular country. It is the difference between the return on a bond 
representative of the debt issued by a country and that on a bond of a country with minimal 
credit risk, denominated in the same currency and with a similar duration.
Special purpose vehicles (SPVs): Used by deposit institutions for various purposes (e.g. secu-
rities issuance), normally, though not always, domiciled in offshore centres and, in Spanish 
accounting regulations, included in banks’ consolidated balance sheets.
Specialised credit institutions: Financial institutions that are not permitted to raise deposits 
from the public, although they can raise close substitutes for deposits, for example by issuing 
securities with a maturity of more than one year or interbank financing.
Specific provision: Provision in the period considered, charged to profit and loss account, to the 
specific bad-debt provision. The risks that should be provisioned, with the application of spe-
cific percentages, with certain exceptions are: assets classified as doubtful in accordance with 
their default, doubtful contingent assets and liabilities, except for guarantees and other indem-
nities given, classified as doubtful for reasons other than default and guarantees and other in-
demnities given, both by reason of their delinquency and for reasons other than their default.
Standardised approach: Regulatory approach to risk measurement and capital requirements 
that is analogous to the current Basel I, but more sensitive to risk as it allows external ratings 
to be used as a measure of risk that affects the weights applied to the counterparty.
Statistical provision: Provision in the period considered, charged to the profit and loss account, 
to the statistical bad-debt fund. This provision is based on the latent (or inherent) risk, which is 
essentially the average expected losses arising from credit risk, estimated on the basis of the 
losses over a complete business cycle. It is calculated as the difference between this latent risk 
and the specific provision for the year. Thus, during the favourable stages of the cycle, when 
specific provisions are less than average losses, provisions are made to the statistical fund, 
while during cyclical downturns, amounts from the previously created fund are credited to the 
profit and loss account. These two provisions therefore have opposite effects on the profit and 
loss account. The maximum level of the statistical fund is three times the latent risk. This risk 
can be calculated using the institution’s internal model, when so authorised by the Banco de 
España, or using the standard model supplied by the regulator.
Structural position in foreign currency: Unhedged fixed assets in foreign currency (investments 
in property for own use, significant holding of a permanent nature and, in the individual balance 
sheet for business in Spain, endowments to branches abroad), that are converted at the ex-
change rate of the date of their purchase.
Subordinated debt: Debt which, in the event of liquidation, ranks for repayment behind other 
debt, only preceding shares and, where applicable, non-voting equity units and preference 
shares.
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Subsidiaries: Independent legal persons established in accordance with the laws of the coun-
try in which they reside that are totally or partially owned by their parent company. In general, 
in the FSR this term refers to subsidiaries in consolidated groups located abroad.
Syndicated loans: Loans for which a temporary association of financial institutions is created 
to distribute the shares in the large amount of the loan among them.
Tier 1 capital: Basically made up of capital, disclosed reserves, preference shares and non-
voting equity units, less goodwill.
Tier 1 ratio: More restrictive measure than the solvency ratio, since the numerator consists of 
tier 1 capital only. It must be at least 4%.
Tier 2 capital: Basically made up of subordinated debt, although certain limits apply.
Total lending: See credit portfolio.
Total spread or return on intermediation: Difference between the average return on earning fi-
nancial assets and the average cost of interest-bearing financial liabilities. The sum of the in-
stitution’s asset and liability spreads.
Trading book: Fixed-income securities or equities that are publicly quoted and whose trading 
is rapid, deep and cannot be influenced by individual private agents, which institutions main-
tain in their assets for short-term profit on their price movements.
Treasury or trading activity: Operations carried out for profit on the wholesale financial markets 
by a special unit of the institution, involving the management of risk positions, speculation, 
within the limits set by the institution, and/or covering its borrowing requirements and hedging 
its risks. These operations also provide services to customers.
Uncommitted assets or solvency margin of insurance companies: equivalent to the own funds 
of credit institutions.
Unexpected losses: Unanticipated losses on a portfolio. Calculated as the loss associated 
with a sufficiently high confidence level of the loss distribution, less the expected loss.
Universal banking: That performed by institutions which engage in corporate, investment and 
retail banking activities without distinction.
Unrealised capital gains: Unrealised net profit arising from the difference between the market 
and book value of the securities recorded in the institution’s securities portfolio.
Unsectorised accounts: The capital and provisions of an institution less the net balances (as-
sets – liabilities) of accrual accounts and other accounts, that are not assigned to any grouping 
either on the basis of residence (residents/non-residents) or on the basis of an institutional 
criterion (monetary financial institutions, general government and other sectors).
Value at risk (VaR): Maximum loss on a portfolio, to which a certain probability is assigned, 
during a specific time horizon.
Weighted average range: Weighted average bid-ask spread for listed securities.
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Studies and reports REGULAR
Annual Report (in Spanish and English)
Economic Bulletin (quarterly) (the Spanish version is monthly)
Financial Stability Report (in Spanish and English) (half-yearly)
Memoria del Servicio de Reclamaciones (annual)
Mercado de Deuda Pública (annual)
Report on Banking Supervision in Spain (in Spanish and English) (annual)
The Spanish Balance of Payments and International Investment Position (in Spanish and English) (annual)
NON-PERIODICAL
Central Balance Sheet Data Office: commissioned studies
Notas de Estabilidad Financiera
ECONOMIC STUDIES
51 ELOÍSA ORTEGA: La inversión extranjera directa en España (1986-1990) (1992).
52 ALBERTO CABRERO, JOSÉ LUIS ESCRIVÁ AND TERESA SASTRE: Demand equations of the new mo ne ta ry 
aggregates (1992). (The Spanish original of this publication has the same number.)
53 ÁNGEL LUIS GÓMEZ JIMÉNEZ AND JOSÉ MA RÍA ROLDÁN ALEGRE: Analysis of fiscal policy in Spain: a 
macroeconomic perspective (1988-1994) (1995). (The Spanish original of this publication has the same 
number.)
54 JUAN MARÍA PEÑALOSA: El papel de la posición fi nan cie ra de los agentes económicos en la trans mi sión de 
la política monetaria (1996).
55 ISABEL ARGIMÓN MAZA: El comportamiento del aho rro y su composición: evidencia empírica para al gu nos 
países de la Unión Europea (1996).
56 JUAN AYUSO HUERTAS: Riesgo cambiario y ries go de tipo de interés bajo regímenes alternativos de tipo de 
cambio (1996).
57 OLYMPIA BOVER, MANUEL ARELLANO AND SA MUEL BENTOLILA: Unemployment duration, ben efit duration, 
and the business cycle (1996). (The Span ish original of this publication has the same num ber.)
58 JOSÉ MARÍN ARCAS: Stabilising effects of fiscal po li cy. Volumes I and II (1997). (The Spanish original of this 
publication has the same number.)
59 JOSÉ LUIS ESCRIVÁ, IGNACIO FUENTES, FER NAN DO GUTIÉRREZ AND M.ª TERESA SASTRE: El sistema 
bancario español ante la Unión Mo ne ta ria Eu ro pea (1997).
60 ANA BUISÁN AND ESTHER GORDO: El sector ex te rior en España (1997).
61 ÁNGEL ESTRADA, FRANCISCO DE CASTRO, IG NA CIO HERNANDO AND JAVIER VALLÉS: La in ver sión en 
España (1997).
62 ENRIQUE ALBEROLA ILA: España en la Unión Mo ne ta ria. Una aproximación a sus costes y be ne fi cios (1998).
63 GABRIEL QUIRÓS (ed.): Mercado español de deu da pública. Volumes I and II (1998).
64 FERNANDO C. BALLABRIGA, LUIS JULIÁN ÁL VA REZ GONZÁLEZ AND JAVIER JAREÑO MO RA GO: A BVAR 
macroeconometric model for the Spa nish eco nomy: methodology and results (2000). (The Spanish original of 
this publication has the same num ber.)
65 ÁNGEL ESTRADA AND ANA BUISÁN: El gasto de las familias en España (1999).
66 ROBERTO BLANCO ESCOLAR: El mercado es pa ñol de renta variable. Análisis de la liquidez e in fluen cia del 
mercado de derivados (1999).
67 JUAN AYUSO, IGNACIO FUENTES, JUAN PE ÑA LO SA AND FERNANDO RESTOY: El mercado mo ne ta rio 
español en la Unión Monetaria (1999).
68 ISABEL ARGIMÓN, ÁNGEL LUIS GÓMEZ, PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS AND FRANCISCO MARTÍ: El sector 
de las Administraciones Públicas en Es pa ña (1999).
69 JAVIER ANDRÉS, IGNACIO HERNANDO AND J. DA VID LÓPEZ-SALIDO: Assessing the benefits of  price 
stability: the international experience (2000).
70 OLYMPIA BOVER AND MARIO IZQUIERDO: Qua li ty-adjusted prices: hedonic methods and im pli ca tio ns for 
National Accounts (2001). (The Spanish ori gi nal of this publication has the same number.)
71 MARIO IZQUIERDO AND M.ª DE LOS LLANOS MA TEA: An approximation to biases in the mea su re ment of 
Spanish macroeconomic variables de ri ved from pro duct quality changes (2001). (The Spa nish ori gi nal of this 
publication has the same num ber.)
72 MARIO IZQUIERDO, OMAR LICANDRO AND AL BER TO MAYDEU: Car quality improvements and  price indices 
in Spain (2001). (The Spanish original of this publication has the same number.)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS
Note: The full list of each series is given in the Publications Catalogue.
All publications are available in electronic format, with the exception of statistical and miscellaneous publications and texts of the Human 
Resources Development Division.
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73 OLYMPIA BOVER AND PILAR VELILLA: Hedonic house prices without characteristics: the case of new 
multiunit housing (2001). (The Spa nish ori gi nal of this pu bli ca tion has the same num ber.)
74 MARIO IZQUIERDO AND M.ª DE LOS LLANOS MA TEA: Hedonic prices for personal computers in Spain 
during the 90s (2001).  (The Spa nish ori gi nal of this pu bli ca tion has the same number.)
75 PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS: Empresa pública, privatización y eficiencia (2004).
ECONOMIC HISTORY STUDIES
25 MARÍA JESÚS FUENTE: Finanzas y ciudades. El trán si to del siglo XV al XVI (1992).
26 HERNÁN ASDRÚBAL SILVA: El Comercio entre Es pa ña y el Río de la Plata (1778-1810) (1993).
27 JOHN ROBERT FISHER: El Comercio entre Es pa ña e Hispanoamérica (1797-1820) (1993).
28 BEATRIZ CÁRCELES DE GEA: Fraude y ad mi nis tra ción fiscal en Castilla. La Comisión de Millones
(1632-1658): Poder fiscal y privilegio jurídico-po lí ti co (1994).
29 PEDRO TEDDE AND CARLOS MARICHAL (eds.): La formación de los bancos centrales en España y Amé ri ca 
Latina (siglos XIX y XX). Vol. I: España y Méxi co (1994).
30 PEDRO TEDDE AND CARLOS MARICHAL (eds.): La formación de los bancos centrales en España y Amé ri ca 
Latina (siglos XIX y XX). Vol. II: Su ra mé ri ca y el Caribe (1994).
31 BEATRIZ CÁRCELES DE GEA: Reforma y fraude fis cal en el reinado de Carlos II. La Sala de Millones
(1658-1700) (1995).
32 SEBASTIÁN COLL AND JOSÉ IGNACIO FORTEA: Guía de fuentes cuantitativas para la historia eco nó mi ca de 
España. Vol. I: Recursos y sectores pro duc ti vos (1995).
33 FERNANDO SERRANO MANGAS: Vellón y me ta les preciosos en la Corte del Rey de España (1618-1668) 
(1996).
34 ALBERTO SABIO ALCUTÉN: Los mercados in for ma les de crédito y tierra en una comunidad rural ara go ne sa 
(1850-1930) (1996).
35 M.ª GUADALUPE CARRASCO GONZÁLEZ: Los ins tru men tos del comercio colonial en el Cádiz del si glo XVII 
(1650-1700) (1996).
36 CARLOS ÁLVAREZ NOGAL: Los banqueros de Fe li pe IV y los metales preciosos americanos (1621-1665) 
(1997).
37 EVA PARDOS MARTÍNEZ: La incidencia de la pro tec ción arancelaria en los mercados españoles (1870-1913) 
(1998).
38 ELENA MARÍA GARCÍA GUERRA: Las acu ña cio nes de moneda de vellón durante el reinado de Fe li pe III 
(1999).
39 MIGUEL ÁNGEL BRINGAS GUTIÉRREZ: La pro duc ti vi dad de los factores en la agricultura española
(1752-1935) (2000).
40 ANA CRESPO SOLANA: El comercio marítimo en tre Ámsterdam y Cádiz (1713-1778) (2000).
41 LLUIS CASTAÑEDA PEIRÓN: El Banco de España (1874-1900): la red de sucursales y los nuevos ser vi cios 
financieros (2001).
42 SEBASTIÁN COLL AND JOSÉ IGNACIO FORTEA: Guía de fuentes cuantitativas para la historia económica de 
España. Vol. II: Finanzas y renta nacional (2002).
43 ELENA MARTÍNEZ RUIZ: El sector exterior durante la autarquía. Una reconstrucción de las balanzas de pagos 
de España, 1940-1958. Revised edition (2003).
44 INÉS ROLDÁN DE MONTAUD: La banca de emisión en Cuba (1856-1898) (2004).
45 ALFONSO HERRANZ LONCÁN: La dotación de infraestructuras en España, 1844-1935 (2004).
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